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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 
Volume 102 Spring 2019 Number 3 
   
SECURING THE NATION OR ENTRENCHING 
THE BOARD? THE EVOLUTION OF CFIUS 
REVIEW OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
AMY DEEN WESTBROOK* 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), which 
reviews transactions based on national security concerns, has recently become 
critical to the operation of the U.S. economy.  In March of 2018, CFIUS review 
led to the prohibition of Broadcom Limited’s acquisition of Qualcomm Corp., 
which would have been the largest technology merger in history.  In August of 
2018, CFIUS was dramatically expanded with the enactment of the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA).  Major 
transactions must now reckon with the uncertainties of CFIUS review.   
Created over thirty years ago as a reporting and monitoring committee, 
CFIUS has evolved into a formidable force with the power to review and 
investigate foreign investments in U.S. businesses, and to recommend that the 
President prohibit or order divestment of those investments.  This Article traces 
the origins of CFIUS from its establishment in 1975 through the changes made 
by the 1988 Exon–Florio Amendment, the Foreign Investment and National 
Security Act of 2007, and now FIRRMA.  The Article examines the key 
transactions CFIUS has considered, and CFIUS’s expansive understandings of 
what constitute U.S. businesses and its authority over foreign investors. 
In the Broadcom–Qualcomm transaction, CFIUS review was requested by 
target company (Qualcomm) board, and the review and resulting Presidential 
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order operated as a powerful antitakeover defense.  Turning from history to 
process, this Article looks closely at the ramifications of corporate boards 
seeking CFIUS review as a defensive measure to ward off hostile takeovers, a 
kind of “super poison pill.”  To that end, the Article looks at mergers and 
acquisitions, and the longstanding conceptions of both the market for corporate 
control and the agency problem in corporate governance.  The Article then 
reviews board powers and the traditional antitakeover measures, as well as the 
jurisprudence developed by state courts to review those defenses. 
CFIUS review may be deployed by corporate boards as an antitakeover 
device.  Given the strong global M&A market, and the significant increase in 
CFIUS’s jurisdiction as a result of the enactment of FIRRMA, CFIUS is 
expected to review more transactions, including more hostile takeovers.  In 
assessing notifications in this context, CFIUS may benefit from the 
jurisprudence developed by state courts.  Given the amount of global capital 
being invested across borders, and the intensity of global security concerns, 
foreign investment transactions are likely to continue, and to continue to need 
review, for the foreseeable future.  A CFIUS review process that can assess 
target board motivations and measures, with an experienced perspective on 
blocking or allowing the transaction, will help ensure that CFIUS review 
achieves its national security goals without doing unnecessary societal harm.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 13, 2018, President Trump signed the Foreign Investment Risk 
Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) into law.1  FIRRMA vastly 
expanded the reach of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United 
States (CFIUS or the Committee), an interagency committee with the effective 
power to prohibit a wide range of acquisition transactions with foreign 
connections.2  In early 2018, even before FIRRMA extended CFIUS’s reach, 
CFIUS made headlines when it recommended that the President block 
Broadcom Limited’s (Broadcom’s) attempted acquisition of Qualcomm, Inc. 
(Qualcomm).3  Had it been successful, the takeover would have constituted the 
 
1. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174–2207 (2018) (including the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) amending 50 U.S.C. § 4565).  
2. See Chelsea Naso, 5 Ways CFIUS Will Change with New Law, LAW360 (Aug. 7, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/1070864/5-ways-cfius-will-change-with-new-
law?nl_pk=72e67b2b-a356-4164-9e1a-
22d8437314c9&utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=corporate 
[https://perma.cc/5EMP-M223] (describing the new law as an “overhaul” and stating that “vast 
changes are on the horizon” for CFIUS). 
3. See infra Section II.B. 
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largest technology deal in history.4  Instead, Qualcomm’s request for CFIUS 
review led to the government’s prohibition of the deal.   
This Article has two interrelated purposes.  First, the Article analyzes 
CFIUS’s evolution and provides an overview of its increasing importance.  
Second, this Article suggests that the power to block acquisition transactions 
makes CFIUS a sort of “super poison pill,” as exemplified by the recent 
prohibition of Broadcom’s effort to acquire Qualcomm.  Like other corporate 
defensive tactics familiar from mergers and acquisitions (M&A) practice, the 
power of CFIUS may be used for good ends, but may also be abused to entrench 
incumbent board of directors members who ought to be replaced.  This Article 
suggests that state corporation law guidelines developed in connection with 
reviews of hostile takeovers can augment CFIUS’s consideration of some of the 
policy interests in acquisition transactions.   
The United States historically has maintained an open posture toward 
foreign investment.5  Government regulation of investment has tended to be 
sector-specific (e.g., shipping, aircraft, mining, energy, lands, communications, 
and banking6) and usually has reflected concerns for national security.  In recent 
years, government review of foreign investment has often been carried out by 
CFIUS.  CFIUS is an interagency committee headed by the Secretary of the 
Treasury that includes the Secretaries of State, Defense, Homeland Security, 
Commerce, and Energy, the Attorney General, the U.S. Trade Representative, 
 
4. Alan Rappeport, Cecilia Kang & Chad Bray, Trump Administration Stalls Largest Tech 
Merger in New Sign of Protectionism, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/dealbook/broadcom-qualcomm-cfius.html 
[https://perma.cc/LRX8-G8LH]. 
5. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 543 (2018) (Conf. Rep.) (expressing Congress’ sense that 
maintaining the U.S. commitment to an “open investment policy” is important, and that the United 
States should continue its policy of “enthusiastically” welcoming and supporting foreign investment 
consistent with the protection of national security).  In 2016, an estimated 8.5% of the U.S. labor force 
had jobs resulting from foreign investment, and new foreign direct investment in U.S. manufacturing 
totaled $129.4 billion. Id. at 542 (setting out Congress’ findings with respect to the role of foreign 
investment in the United States); see also Brandt J.C. Pasco, United States National Security Reviews 
of Foreign Direct Investment, 29 ICSID REV. 350, 352 (2014) (describing the “long-standing policy 
of the United States . . . to support open investment and national treatment for foreign direct 
investment”).  
6. MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31103, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: MAJOR FEDERAL STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS 8–12 (2013) (reporting on the 
restrictions in each of these industries); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-608, 
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: LAWS LIMITING FOREIGN INVESTMENT AFFECT CERTAIN U.S. ASSETS 
AND AGENCIES HAVE VARIOUS ENFORCEMENT PROCESSES 47–57 (2009) (listing restrictions on 
foreign investment in agriculture, transportation, communications, natural resources and energy, and 
banking in Appendix II).  
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and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy.7  Using the 
CFIUS review process, the President may, for example, block a transaction by 
or with a foreign person which could result in foreign control of any U.S. 
business if there is credible evidence that the transaction threatens to impair 
national security.8   
More struggles over acquisitions with foreign involvement may be 
expected.  In recent years, the international M&A market has been strong,9 and 
the United States has led the world as the largest recipient of foreign direct 
investment funds.10  Over the same period, the linchpin of CFIUS review—
what constitutes a threat to U.S. national security posed by foreign investment 
transactions—has dramatically expanded.11  This expansion was statutorily 
inscribed in, and further extended by, FIRRMA.  In sum, more transactions, 
with greater economic significance, are likely to be subjected to CFIUS review 
and potential alteration or prohibition.12   
Of the foreign investments subject to CFIUS review, unsolicited bids are of 
particular interest.  Although the majority of foreign acquisitions of United 
States companies are negotiated, a substantial number of foreign acquisitions 
 
7. The Secretary of Labor and the Director of National Intelligence serve in an ex officio 
capacity, and there may be an additional five Executive Office members (the Director of the Office of 
Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs, Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and Assistant 
to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism) who “observe and, as appropriate, 
participate in and report to the President.” Exec. Order No. 13,456, 3 C.F.R. § 171 (2009).  The 
President may also appoint temporary members to CFIUS as he determines necessary.  
8. 31 C.F.R. § 800.101 (2017).  The President must also conclude that other laws are inadequate 
or inappropriate to protect the national security.   
9. Cross-border M&A was high in 2015 and 2016, although it declined in 2017. U.N. Conference 
on Trade and Development, 2018 World Investment Report: Investment and New Industrial Policies, 
xi, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2018 (June 6, 2018). 
10. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-494, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES: ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 2 (2018).  
11. Id.  
12. Alexei Alexis, Foreign Deals Reviewed by U.S. Panel to Spike with New Law, BLOOMBERG 
(Aug. 14, 2018), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJpZCI6IjAwMDAwMTY1MjVlOGRiMWFhYjZmZjVmZD
YwZjcwMDAwIiwiY3R4dCI6IkJCTkEiLCJ1dWlkIjoiM2FHZ3puam5WY01oVFluemNWVDZndz
09N0ZlTU1ZNFlwREZlSlJRRE9qdVZZQT09IiwidGltZSI6IjE1MzQyMDEwNzY3MDYiLCJzaWc
iOiJuS2ZlN2hhWXBUb20vK2RPa0grMTlwYWFQSm89IiwidiI6IjEifQ==?emc=bnacare:4&service
_acronym=CARE [https://perma.cc/RXF6-SLNF] (noting the CFIUS is expected to be “flooded” with 
additional notifications under FIRRMA). 
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are hostile takeovers.13  As might be expected, hostile takeover attempts tend to 
be met by any of an array of defensive tactics developed by U.S. corporation 
law over decades: poison pills, share repurchases, lockups, and so forth.  
Such defensive tactics can be used beneficially by corporate boards to 
protect shareholders from coercive tender offers, or to secure a good price if the 
company is sold to the acquirer.  But defensive tactics may also be used 
perniciously by corporate boards to entrench themselves and incumbent 
management in the face of a challenge to their positions.  The question becomes 
how to separate socially positive defensive tactics from negative ones.  
Delaware and other state courts, in cases like Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum 
Co.,14 have created a jurisprudence that seeks to evaluate the propriety of 
takeover defenses in various circumstances and in light of conflicting 
considerations.   
The antitakeover devices cases recognize that takeovers, or the threat of 
takeovers, can discipline management, lead to more efficient markets, and 
benefit shareholders.15  At the same time, courts have shown great solicitude 
for the board’s authority to direct the affairs of a business corporation in the 
interests of shareholders.  Courts have recognized boards’ authority to oppose 
a takeover deemed inimical to the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders, even while remaining mindful of directors’ potential self-
interested motivations.  These competing concerns in the context of entities 
critical to our society16 have spawned considerable jurisprudence as courts seek 
the appropriate balance.   
The evolution of CFIUS review, however, has resulted in a powerful 
defensive tactic that can be used against entities with foreign connections, in 
some cases slight,17 that attempt hostile takeovers of U.S. entities with national 
security implications.  Using the CFIUS process, in March of 2018, President 
 
13. For example, in 2015, 11% of total M&A value consisted of hostile and unsolicited bids.  
The percentage was 9% in 2016 and 15% in 2017 (including Broadcom’s bid for Qualcomm). Andrew 
R. Brownstein et al., Mergers and Acquisitions: 2018 With a Brief Look Back, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON 
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/29/mergers-and-acquisitions-2018-with-a-brief-look-back/ 
[https://perma.cc/B6HV-CR7F].  
14. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
15. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int’l, 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1985) (“[P]re-planning for 
the contingency of a hostile takeover might reduce the risk that, under the pressure of a takeover bid, 
management will fail to exercise reasonable judgment.”). 
16. Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded 
Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 257 (2010). 
17. See discussion infra Section II.B (noting CFIUS concerns about Chinese competitors 
benefitting from a change on Qualcomm’s research and development prioritization).  
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Trump blocked the hostile takeover of Qualcomm, a U.S. company traded on 
the NASDAQ, by Broadcom, at the time a Singaporean company, also traded 
on the NASDAQ.18  Based on both the President’s explicit and implied power 
over foreign policy19 and the substantial authority conferred on him and on 
CFIUS by Congress,20 a prohibition arising from the CFIUS review process has 
so far proven impossible to overcome.21  The limited reviewability22 of those 
prohibitions creates a risk that CFIUS can be used as an antitakeover device, 
but one that is different in kind from the now-familiar array of defensive tactics 
reviewable under state corporation laws.  As one commentator put it, CFIUS is 
the “ultimate regulatory bazooka.”23   
As it has developed, CFIUS has added a substantial amount of uncertainty 
to the global M&A market.  In addition, the growing workload of CFIUS24 and 
variation among CFIUS reviews have resulted in delays and inconsistencies.25  
Although difficult to quantify, the uncertainties and inconsistencies resulting 
from potential CFIUS review continue to impose costs on potentially beneficial 
transactions.   
Some of those costs are worth bearing.  Some foreign investment 
transactions pose national security risks to the United States.  In a globally 
integrated market with substantial security concerns, governments require the 
ability to review transactions.  Although the President and CFIUS have clear 
authority to block or demand changes to transactions that implicate national 
security, however, the emergence of CFIUS review as an antitakeover measure 
has created new challenges.  In this environment, corporate boards’ lobbying 
 
18. Presidential Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by 
Broadcom Limited, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,631 (Mar. 12, 2018).   
19. See U.S. CONST. art. II. 
20. Congressional power to regulate commerce under Article I of the Constitution can be 
conferred on the President in legislation such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(1977) and several CFIUS-related statutes, discussed infra Parts III, IV, and V.   
21. The single case challenging a CFIUS determination was settled. See discussion infra Section 
IV.C.   
22. See discussion infra Section V.C of review of CFIUS decisions.  
23. Kevin Granville, CFIUS, Powerful and Unseen, Is a Gatekeeper on Major Deals, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/05/business/what-is-cfius.html 
[https://perma.cc/N9FX-ZDDN].  
24. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 542 (2018) (Conf. Rep.) (noting that CFIUS reviews increased by 
55% between 2011 and 2016, while its staffing increased by only 11%). 
25. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-494, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
IN THE UNITED STATES: ACTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS 
FACING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 15, 20 (2018).  FIRRMA is expected to remedy those problems 
in the future by increasing the staffing and funding available to the Committee. See John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232, §§ 1717, 1723, 132 
Stat. 1636, 2192–93, 2204–06 (2018) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(k)(4), 4565(p)).  
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for CFIUS review, in the hopes of being granted a “super poison pill,” may 
result in negative consequences, rent-seeking of a pure sort.   
With FIRRMA’s expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction, more target boards are 
likely to notify unsolicited foreign offers to the Committee.  Depending on the 
case, blocking such transactions may serve national security, or may simply use 
the power of the federal government to protect bad management.  The 
jurisprudence developed by state courts to assess corporations’ defensive 
measures may provide a starting point for CFIUS to craft an approach both 
offering the necessary deference to national security concerns and still 
preventing its review from being manipulated by managers seeking to repel 
hostile acquisitions for self-interested reasons.  This Article argues that, with 
care, CFIUS may safeguard national security while at the same time protecting 
shareholders and the integrity of some of our most dynamic markets.   
Part II analyzes Broadcom’s failed attempt to acquire Qualcomm and 
CFIUS’s role in that transaction.  Parts III, IV, and V examine the history of 
CFIUS and its steady increase in strength and jurisdiction, culminating in the 
passage of FIRRMA.  These parts explain how the Committee evolved from a 
simple monitoring committee to a powerful force in the economy and the world.  
Part VI discusses the M&A environment and the importance of those 
transactions to corporate governance and the economy.  Part VI also reviews 
the considerable state law jurisprudence developed to review antitakeover 
devices and their deployment by corporate boards.  Part VII analyzes the 
potential impacts of the intersection of a powerful CFIUS with the global M&A 
market.  The Article concludes by suggesting that as CFIUS receives more 
notifications by target boards, the Committee and thus U.S. society more 
generally may benefit from consideration of the corporate governance factors 
and methodologies already developed by state courts in the antitakeover 
context.   
II. QUALCOMM USES CFIUS TO “POISON” BROADCOM 
A. Broadcom Seeks to Acquire Qualcomm 
CFIUS review gained widespread recognition as a kind of “super poison 
pill” with Qualcomm’s successful effort to fend off acquisition by Broadcom 
in 2018.  The battle between the giant technology companies captured financial 
media attention for months.26  The target, Qualcomm, is a semiconductor and 
telecommunications company that designs and markets wireless products and 
 
26. Had it been successful, the takeover would have constituted the largest technology deal in 
history. Rappeport et al., supra note 4.  
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services.  The company was established in 1985 in California.  In 1991, it listed 
on the NASDAQ, and it was included in the S&P 500 index and the Fortune 
500 list in 1999.27  The would-be acquirer was Broadcom Limited 
(Broadcom),28 another NASDAQ-listed semiconductor technologies 
company,29 which was domiciled in Singapore at the time.  Broadcom Limited 
had been created in 201630 when Broadcom Corp., a California company 
established in 1991,31 was acquired by Avago Technologies, a Singaporean 
company which itself had been founded in 1961 as a division of Hewlett-
Packard and later spun off.32  When Broadcom Limited began its takeover 
effort, it maintained two headquarters, one in California and one in Singapore.33   
On November 6, 2017, Broadcom made a $70-per-share offer for 
Qualcomm, $8.19 per share above Qualcomm’s publicly traded price, valuing 
the company at $103 billion.34  The offer was unanimously rejected by the 
 
27. QUALCOMM, https://www.qualcomm.com/company/about/history [https://perma.cc/7H8Z-
MBDN] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018).  
28. Broadcom Limited became Broadcom Inc. in April 2018. See discussion infra Section II.E.  
29. The two companies are competitors in the telecommunications industry.   
30. Press Release, Avago Technologies, Avago Technologies to Acquire Broadcom for $37 
Billion, BROADCOM (May 28, 2015), 
http://investors.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=203541&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2053937 
[https://perma.cc/HHY9-R3WL].  At the time, the 2016 takeover was a record in the technology 
industry.   
31. Kim Christensen & Andrea Chang, Broadcom’s Co-founders Built a Behemoth as a 
Formidable Team, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2015, 7:41 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-
samueli-nicholas-20150529-story.html [https://perma.cc/C5HY-RVDX]. 
32. See Paige Tanner, Broadcom: A Product of Several Mergers and Acquisitions, MKT. 
REALIST (Aug. 24, 2016, 3:23 PM), https://marketrealist.com/2016/08/broadcom-product-several-
mergers-acquisitions [https://perma.cc/EPE5-ZFM4]; see also Avago Technologies, Registration 
Statement (Form S-1) at 12, 15 (Aug. 21, 2008), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=6117254 (suggesting that Avago was 
incorporated under Singaporean law in 2005 to benefit from tax incentives available there). 
33. Jill Disis, Broadcom Moving Legal Headquarters Back to U.S., CNN MONEY (Nov. 2, 2017, 
4:32 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/02/news/companies/broadcom-singapore-us-move-
trump/index.html [https://perma.cc/HA8A-EPQR].  
34. The proposal was for $60 in cash and $10 per share in Broadcom shares, a 28% premium 
over the closing price of Qualcomm’s stock on November 2, 2017. Press Release, Broadcom, 
Broadcom Proposes to Acquire Qualcomm for $70.00 per Share in Cash and Stock in Transaction 
Valued at $130 Billion (Nov. 6, 2017), 
http://investors.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=203541&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=2314458 
[https://perma.cc/5FLH-B5JV]; Broadcom Bid for Qualcomm: The Saga So Far, REUTERS (Feb. 27, 
2018, 11:30 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-timeline/broadcom-
bid-for-qualcomm-the-saga-so-far-idUSKCN1GB2FR [https://perma.cc/K3KE-J3RX] (noting that the 
offer valued Qualcomm at $103 billion).   
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Qualcomm board of directors on November 13, 2017, which stated that the 
proposal significantly undervalued Qualcomm.35   
Broadcom then launched a proxy contest, proposing board of director 
candidates with the goal of changing a majority of the Qualcomm board 
members to facilitate acceptance of its offer.  On January 5, 2018, Broadcom 
announced that it had filed its definitive proxy materials, including a proxy 
card, with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).36  Broadcom 
then commenced mailing proxy materials to Qualcomm stockholders in 
preparation for the annual stockholder meeting scheduled for March 6, 2018.37   
In addition, on November 2, 2017, Broadcom announced that it would 
redomicile the company in Delaware, in what some reports speculated was an 
effort to influence its status with respect to CFIUS reviews.  Legal experts 
differed with respect to whether Broadcom, once a Delaware company, 
nonetheless would be subject to CFIUS review as a “foreign person.”38  
Broadcom’s redomiciliation process continued throughout its efforts to acquire 
Qualcomm.  
On February 5, 2018, Broadcom made its “best and final offer” for 
Qualcomm,39 approximately $121 billion ($82-per-share),40 conditioned on the 
consummation of Qualcomm’s then-pending $38 billion offer for the Dutch 
 
35. Press Release, Qualcomm, Qualcomm Board of Directors Unanimously Rejects Broadcom’s 
Unsolicited Proposal (Nov. 13, 2017), 
https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2017/11/13/qualcomm-board-directors-unanimously-
rejects-broadcoms-unsolicited-proposal [https://perma.cc/HW8J-Y5ZC].  
36. Broadcom Inc., Schedule 14A Information (Form DFAN14A) (Jan. 5, 2018).   
37. Broadcom Ltd., Broadcom Files Definitive Proxy Materials and Sends Letter to Qualcomm 
Stockholders, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 5, 2018, 4:21 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/broadcom-files-definitive-proxy-materials-and-sends-letter-to-qualcomm-stockholders-
300578442.html [https://perma.cc/5HVR-ZLZ2].  Broadcom also sought to eliminate changes to 
Qualcomm’s bylaws relating to the election of directors that had been made by the board the prior year 
without shareholder approval. Schedule 14A Information (Form DFAN14A), supra note 36; see also 
Jacob Rund, Broadcom Prepares for Hostile Takeover of Qualcomm, CQ ROLL CALL (Dec. 11, 2017); 
Qualcomm Inc., Schedule 14A Information (Form DEF 14A) at 36, 40 (Dec. 27, 2017) (specifying 
that the changes had been made since July 2016). 
38. See Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Has Ordered Broadcom to Give Notice of Steps to Redomicile, 
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2018, 4:33 PM), https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-qualcomm-m-a-broadcom-
exclusive/us-has-ordered-broadcom-to-give-notice-of-steps-to-redomicile-idUKKCN1GL2XA 
[https://perma.cc/UA9G-QUJ7] (“Lawyers that specialise in advising companies on CFIUS matters 
have been debating . . . whether Broadcom’s bid would be subject to a CFIUS review once it 
redomiciles.”). 
39. Broadcom Bid for Qualcomm: The Saga So Far, supra note 34.  
40. Michael J. de la Merced & Don Clark, Broadcom Raises Its Qualcomm Offer to $121 Billion, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/dealbook/broadcom-
qualcomm-deal.html [https://perma.cc/QVH9-ZKFS].   
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
2019] SECURING THE NATION OR ENTRENCHING THE BOARD? 653 
company NXP Semiconductors NV (NXP).  Qualcomm rejected the Broadcom 
offer on February 8, 2018, citing its “serious deficiencies in value and 
certainty,”41 and instead increased its offer for NXP to $44 billion, raising 
questions regarding the board’s motivations for the increased price.42  
Nevertheless, Broadcom persisted, and on February 9, 2018, Broadcom filed its 
Proposed Agreement and Plan of Merger with the SEC.43   
B. CFIUS Intervenes 
1. Qualcomm Requests CFIUS Review  
In addition to its publicly announced defensive tactics, in January 2018 the 
Qualcomm board secretly availed itself of a different kind of antitakeover 
measure.  Without informing Broadcom, on January 29, 2018, Qualcomm 
voluntarily filed a unilateral notice with CFIUS to trigger review of Broadcom’s 
“solicitation of proxies for purposes of electing a majority of the directors of 
Qualcomm.”44  Qualcomm’s request to CFIUS was unusual: normally review 
is not requested until the parties agree on a deal, and normally it is the acquirer, 
not the seller, which requests the review.   
Political actors also came into play.  In February and March of 2018, several 
U.S. legislators, including Congressmen Duncan Hunter (R-CA)45 and John 
Cornyn (R-TX),46 and Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA),47 contacted the 
administration to express concerns about Broadcom’s attempted takeover and 
to request CFIUS investigation.  On Sunday, March 4, 2018, the Department of 
 
41. Broadcom Bid for Qualcomm: The Saga So Far, supra note 34. 
42. Kate Cox, US Security Panel Orders Delay on Potential Broadcom Takeover of Qualcomm, 
CQ ROLL CALL (Mar. 5, 2018).  
43. Broadcom Ltd., Broadcom Cayman L.P., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Feb. 9, 2018). 
44. Letter from Aimen N. Mir, Deputy Assistant Sec’y Inv. Sec., Dep’t of Treasury, to Mark 
Plotkin, Covington & Burling LLP, and Theodore Kassinger, O’Melveny & Myers LLP (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/804328/000110465918015036/a18-7296_7ex99d1.htm) 
[https://perma.cc/EZZ2-F6JH].   
45. Trump Administration Follows Hunter Lead on Reviewing Qualcomm Deal, CONGRESSMAN 
DUNCAN HUNTER (Mar. 19, 2018), https://hunter.house.gov/press-release/trump-administration-
follows-hunter-lead-reviewing-qualcomm-deal [https://perma.cc/SBJ4-DPU7].  
46. Diane Bartz, Exclusive: Secretive U.S. Security Panel Discussing Broadcom’s Qualcomm 
Bid–Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2018, 9:24 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-qualcomm-m-a-
broadcom-exclusive/exclusive-secretive-u-s-security-panel-discussing-broadcoms-qualcomm-bid-
sources-idUSKCN1GB09V [https://perma.cc/ZMQ2-UYAH].   
47. Alan K. Ota, Feinstein Joins Push for Security Check of Bid for Qualcomm, CQ ROLL CALL 
(Mar. 2, 2018).  
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the Treasury filed a notice broadening the scope of the CFIUS review to cover 
the proposed hostile takeover.48   
2. CFIUS Acts 
Confronted with significant pressure regarding its review and Broadcom’s 
pending reincorporation in the United States, CFIUS acted.49  On Sunday, 
March 4, 2018, two days before Qualcomm’s scheduled annual stockholder 
meeting, CFIUS issued an Interim Order announcing both its review of and an 
investigation into a transaction involving the takeover of Qualcomm by 
Broadcom.50  Citing the fact that Broadcom was “engaged in a concerted effort 
to complete a hostile takeover of Qualcomm, including acquiring proxies to 
elect six new directors (a majority) of the Board of Qualcomm in order to 
approve the [merger],”51 CFIUS determined that there was a “covered 
transaction” that posed national security risks to the United States52 and ordered 
a number of interim measures.   
CFIUS ordered Qualcomm to delay its annual stockholder meeting, 
including the election of the Board of Directors, for 30 days.53  Qualcomm was 
prohibited from accepting, or taking any action in furtherance of accepting, any 
type of merger, acquisition, or takeover agreement with Broadcom.54  CFIUS 
also ordered Broadcom to provide CFIUS with five business days’ notice before 
taking any action toward redomiciliation in the United States.55   
 
48. Order of Steven T. Mnuchin, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, on Behalf of CFIUS, 
Interim Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Qualcomm, Inc. by Broadcom Limited (Mar. 4, 
2018) (describing the CFIUS’s expansion of its review as an “agency notice” filed by the Department 
of the Treasury). 
49. Some experts have speculated that the redomiciliation initiative accounted for the CFIUS’s 
willingness to intervene in the takeover bid before the companies actually reached agreement. Michael 
E. Leiter et al., Analysis of Executive Order Prohibiting Broadcom’s Acquisition of Qualcomm, 
SKADDEN (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2018/03/analysis-of-
executive-order-prohibiting [https://perma.cc/XZ5Z-BSQ3] (“Broadcom’s move to redomicile added 
significant complexity to the CFIUS-related issues and undoubtedly led to a hurried consideration of 
the substantive outcome of CFIUS’ response.”). 
50. Interim Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Qualcomm, Inc. by Broadcom Limited, 
supra note 48.  According to Broadcom, it was not informed of the CFIUS review until that day. See 
discussion infra Section II.C.   
51. Interim Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Qualcomm, Inc. by Broadcom Limited, 
supra note 48.  
52. Id. 
53. Id. at Art. 1.1.  CFIUS also ordered Qualcomm to hold the acceptance or count of any votes 
or proxies for directors in abeyance during that period.  
54. Id. at Art. 1.2. 
55. Id. at Art. 1.3.  
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On March 5, 2018, CFIUS wrote to Broadcom’s attorneys and detailed the 
Committee’s unclassified concerns56 with the proposed takeover and its 
decision to launch a full investigation.57  CFIUS explained that its concerns 
related to “the risks associated with Broadcom’s relationships with third party 
foreign entities and the national security effects of Broadcom’s business 
intentions with respect to Qualcomm.”58  In particular, CFIUS noted three areas 
of particular concern: Qualcomm’s technological leadership; security concerns 
resulting from the loss of such leadership; and security concerns resulting from 
the disruption of the U.S. government’s supply chain.   
For the Committee, the first area of concern was maintaining Qualcomm’s 
leadership in technology and standard-setting.  Citing Qualcomm’s superior 
technology, CFIUS asserted that “Qualcomm’s technological success and 
innovation is driven [sic] by its unmatched expertise and research and 
development (‘R&D’) expenditure.”59  CFIUS found that Qualcomm’s 
expertise and R&D expenditure drive U.S. leadership in standard-setting bodies 
and “have positioned Qualcomm as the current leading company in 5G 
technology development and standard setting.”60   
The Committee identified its second area of concern as the national security 
risks created by any weakening of Qualcomm’s technological leadership.  
CFIUS claimed that “significant confidence in the integrity of [U.S. 
telecommunications] infrastructure as it relates to national security” arises from 
having Qualcomm, a “well-known and trusted company[,] hold the dominant 
role.”61  Thus, the Committee concluded, a reduction in Qualcomm’s long-term 
technological competitiveness and influence, “a weakening of Qualcomm’s 
position,” would leave an opening for Chinese companies “including Huawei”62 
 
56. Presumably the government had concerns that could not be shared with the parties because 
of their sensitive nature. See discussion of Ralls, infra Section IV.C (discussing Ralls’ due process 
claim based on the fact that the government had not shared its unclassified concerns with the company 
before ordering that the company divest itself of its investment). 
57. Letter from Aimen N. Mir, supra note 44. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id.  Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. is a Chinese telecommunications and consumer 
electronics company that is politically and economically controversial in the United States. See, e.g., 
Christopher Crosby, Huawei Enlists FTC to Fight U.S. National Security Ban, LAW360 (Aug. 29, 
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1078010/huawei-enlists-ftc-to-fight-us-national-security-ban 
[https://perma.cc/MH5U-9G5S] (reporting that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019 prohibited U.S. federal agencies from using Huawei technology); Jody Godoy, Huawei Exec’s 
Arrest Just the Beginning, Attys Say, LAW 360 (Dec. 6, 2018), 
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to “compete robustly” in the 5G standard-setting process.63  A resulting shift to 
Chinese dominance in 5G, CFIUS found, would have substantial negative 
national security consequences for the United States.   
In order to demonstrate that the Broadcom acquisition would cause a 
reduction in Qualcomm R&D and competitiveness, and create a void to be filled 
by Chinese competitors, CFIUS cited Broadcom’s statements that it was 
looking to take a “‘private-equity’-style direction” if it acquired Qualcomm.64  
CFIUS interpreted this direction as entailing a reduction of long-term 
investment such as R&D and a focus on short-term profitability.65  CFIUS also 
pointed to the fact that Broadcom had arranged $106 billion in debt financing 
to support the Qualcomm acquisition, and claimed that “[t]his debt load could 
increase pressure for short-term profitability, potentially to the detriment of 
longer term investments.”66  CFIUS claimed that recent Broadcom acquisitions 
had been followed by reductions in R&D investment, and that “former 
employees allege that it underinvests in long-term product development.”67  
Finally, the Committee found that Broadcom’s CEO had criticized 
Qualcomm’s licensing methodology,68 and that “[c]hanges to Qualcomm’s 
business model would likely negatively impact the core R&D expenditures of 
national security concern.”69   
CFIUS identified its third area of particular concern as the national security 
risk related to the disruption of the trusted supply relationship between 
Qualcomm and the U.S. government, in particular the Department of Defense.  
The Committee wrote that “[l]imitation or cessation of supply of Qualcomm 
 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1108848/huawei-exec-s-arrest-just-the-beginning-attys-say 
[https://perma.cc/XH96-9XJ4] (reporting on the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Canada on 
U.S. charges).  
63. Letter from Aimen N. Mir, supra note 44. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. 
68. Although the government criticized Broadcom’s suggestion that Qualcomm’s licensing 
methodology should be changed, it is important to note that smartphone consumers were 
simultaneously pursuing antitrust litigation over Qualcomm’s patent licensing practices.  The Federal 
Trade Commission and dozens of proposed class actions were consolidated in the Northern District of 
California in April of 2017 and as of this writing that litigation is still ongoing. See, e.g., FTC v. 
Qualcomm Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98632 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017); 
see also Matthew Perlman, Calif. Law at Issue as Qualcomm Fights Giant Class Cert., LAW360 (Dec. 
6, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1108557/calif-law-at-issue-as-qualcomm-fights-giant-
class-cert- [https://perma.cc/PY9W-QXQ2] (noting that the class as certified by the California federal 
court potentially includes nearly every cellphone owner in the United States).  
69. Letter from Aimen N. Mir, supra note 44. 
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products or services to the U.S. government could have a detrimental effect on 
national security.”70   
C. Broadcom Responds 
Broadcom released a statement the same day, objecting strongly to the 
surprise CFIUS action and the delay in the Qualcomm shareholder meeting: 
Broadcom was informed on Sunday night that on January 29, 
2018, Qualcomm secretly filed a voluntary request with 
CFIUS to initiate an investigation, resulting in a delay of 
Qualcomm’s [a]nnual [m]eeting 48 hours before it was to take 
place . . .  It is critical that Qualcomm stockholders know that 
Qualcomm did not once mention submitting a voluntary notice 
to CFIUS in any of its interactions with Broadcom to date, 
including in the two meetings on February 14, 2018 and on 
February 23, 2018.  This can only be seen as an intentional lack 
of disclosure–both to Broadcom and to its own stockholders.  
This brings Qualcomm’s “engagement theater” to a new low.71   
Broadcom argued that the CFIUS review was being used by the Qualcomm 
board to further its own interests:  
This was a blatant, desperate act by Qualcomm to entrench its 
incumbent board of directors and prevent its own stockholders 
from voting for Broadcom’s independent director 
nominees . . . .  It should be clear to everyone that this is part 
of an unprecedented effort by Qualcomm to disenfranchise its 
own stockholders.72   
Broadcom emphasized that almost all of its directors and senior 
management were from the United States.73  In fact, Broadcom pointed out, it 
was largely owned by the same U.S. institutional investors that own 
Qualcomm.74  Broadcom also explained that it was in the process of 
redomiciling, and argued that once it was incorporated in Delaware, CFIUS 
jurisdiction would be eliminated: “Upon completion of the redomiciliation, 
Broadcom’s proposed acquisition of Qualcomm will not be a CFIUS covered 
transaction.”75 
 
70. Id. 
71. Press Release, Broadcom, Broadcom Disappointed Will of Qualcomm Stockholders to be 
Deferred (Mar. 5, 2018), http://investors.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=203541&p=irol-
newsArticle_Print&ID=2336047 [https://perma.cc/F4V7-995K]. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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In a letter to Congress on March 9, 2018, Broadcom also pledged not to sell 
sensitive assets to foreign buyers, and to support 5G technology in the United 
States.76  Broadcom asserted that “[a]ny notion that a combined Broadcom–
Qualcomm would slash funding or cede leadership in 5G is completely 
unfounded . . . .  We have a proven track record of investing in and growing 
core franchises in the companies we acquire.”77   
D. The President Acts 
A week later, before CFIUS had formally completed its review,78 President 
Trump acted.  Citing “credible evidence” that Broadcom Limited (at the time 
still a Singaporean company)79 “might take action that threatens to impair the 
national security of the United States”80 through control of Qualcomm, the 
President prohibited the proposed takeover of Qualcomm as well as “any 
substantially equivalent merger, acquisition, or takeover, whether effected 
directly or indirectly.”81  The March 12, 2008 Executive Order went on to 
require that Broadcom “immediately and permanently abandon the proposed 
takeover.”82   
In addition to prohibiting the proposed acquisition, the Executive Order 
“disqualified” “[a]ll 15 individuals listed as potential candidates on 
the. . . Proxy Card” that Broadcom had filed with the SEC “from standing for 
election as directors of Qualcomm.”83  It also prohibited Qualcomm from 
accepting the nomination of or votes for any of those candidates.84  Finally, the 
Executive Order ordered Qualcomm to provide notice of its annual stockholder 
 
76. Press Release, Broadcom, In Letter to Congress, Broadcom Pledges to Make the U.S. the 
Global Leader in 5G (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.broadcom.com/news/product-releases/broadcom-
expands-ethernet-switch-software?pid=2337280 [https://perma.cc/CW34-5S3Q]. 
77. Chelsea Naso, Broadcom Says It Won’t Sell Sensitive Qualcomm Assets, LAW360 (Mar. 9, 
2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1020409/broadcom-says-it-won-t-sell-sensitive-qualcomm-
assets [https://perma.cc/4ABT-WMWU]. 
78. M.P. McQueen, How Lawyers Used CFIUS Review to Defeat Broadcom’s Takeover of 
Qualcomm, AM. LAW. INT’L (Apr. 18, 2018, 3:40 PM), 
https://www.law.com/international/2018/04/18/how-lawyers-used-cfius-review-to-defeat-broadcoms-
takeover-of-qualcomm-396-2801/?slreturn=20180517145742 [https://perma.cc/223B-28SN]. 
79. The Presidential Order also included Broadcom Limited’s affiliates Broadcom Corporation 
(a California corporation) and Broadcom Cayman L.P. (a Cayman Islands limited partnership).  
80. Presidential Order Regarding the Proposed Takeover of Qualcomm Incorporated by 
Broadcom Limited, supra note 18. 
81. Id.  
82. Id.  The order also required Broadcom to certify to CFIUS when it had done so, and to 
provide specific weekly reports to CFIUS until the process was completed.   
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
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meeting as soon as possible and to hold the meeting no later than 10 days after 
that notice.85   
E. The Aftermath of the Block 
On March 14, 2018, Broadcom announced that it was withdrawing its offer 
for Qualcomm.86  On March 16, 2018, Qualcomm removed Paul Jacobs, son of 
the company’s founder and a former Chairman of the Board and CEO of the 
company, from its board after he broached a “long-shot bid” for the company.87  
The board replaced Jacobs with an independent director.  On March 23, 2018, 
Qualcomm finally held its 2018 annual stockholder meeting, at which all 10 
incumbent directors, running unopposed, were reelected.88  Also on March 23, 
2018, over 99% of the Broadcom shareholders voted to redomicile in 
Delaware,89 and that process was completed on April 4, 2018.90   
Broadcom’s expansion plans have continued since the prohibition of the 
Qualcomm acquisition.  On July 11, 2018, now U.S.-domiciled Broadcom 
announced an $18.9 billion agreement to acquire New York-based CA 
Technologies, Inc., an information technology software company.91  That 
 
85. Id. 
86. Press Release, Broadcom, Broadcom Withdraws Offer to Acquire Qualcomm (Mar. 14, 
2018), http://investors.broadcom.com/phoenix.zhtml?ID=2337987&c=203541&p=irol-newsArticle 
[https://perma.cc/5MKP-SEFG]. 
87. Dana Cimilluca et al., Qualcomm Ousts Paul Jacobs from Board as He Chases Long-Shot 
Bid for Chip Giant, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ex-qualcomm-
chairman-ceo-paul-jacobs-may-step-down-from-board-1521213846 [https://perma.cc/X9K4-BZEM].  
Recent reports indicate that Jacobs is still considering such a bid, which would present Qualcomm with 
another takeover battle. See, e.g., Selina Wang, Paul Jacobs Is Still Thinking About Taking Qualcomm 
Private, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 28, 2018, 4:06 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-11-
28/paul-jacobs-is-still-thinking-about-taking-qualcomm-private [https://perma.cc/SQ86-DN3D].   
88. Qualcomm Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 23, 2018); see also Press Release, 
Qualcomm, Qualcomm Announces Preliminary Results of 2018 Annual Meeting of Stockholders 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.qualcomm.com/news/releases/2018/03/23/qualcomm-announces-
preliminary-results-2018-annual-meeting-stockholders [https://perma.cc/M58V-BUD7].  Qualcomm 
also announced that the stockholder proposal to undo certain amendments to Qualcomm’s bylaws was 
not approved.  
89. Broadcom Ltd., Broadcom Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 26, 2018).  
Redomiciliation was still subject to approval by the High Court of the Republic of Singapore.  
90. Broadcom Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Apr. 4, 2018).  Broadcom’s existing co-
headquarters in San Jose then became its sole headquarters. Broadcom Completes Move to U.S. from 
Singapore, REUTERS (Apr. 4, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-broadcom-
domicile/broadcom-completes-move-to-u-s-from-singapore-idUSKCN1HB34G 
[https://perma.cc/C5CA-E492]. 
91. Press Release, Broadcom to Acquire CA Technologies for $18.9 Billion in Cash, CA 
TECHNOLOGIES (July 11, 2018), https://www.ca.com/us/company/newsroom/press-
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acquisition was completed, apparently without CFIUS involvement, on 
November 5, 2018.92   
Qualcomm failed to win approval from Chinese antitrust regulators and was 
forced to abandon its efforts to acquire NXP in July 2018 and pay a $2 billion 
termination fee.93  Qualcomm also faces a number of shareholder suits arising 
from its actions in connection with the Broadcom takeover effort.  Those suits 
allege, for example, disclosure failures by the company94 and improper board 
behavior,95 including its “clandestine action to petition” for CFIUS review.96   
III. CFIUS ORIGINS 
A. A Substantial Evolution 
CFIUS’s prohibition of one of the largest takeover attempts in U.S. history 
demonstrated CFIUS’s power, which was further increased by FIRRMA.97  
Although the President’s prohibition of Broadcom’s attempted takeover of 
 
releases/2018/broadcom-to-acquire-ca-technologies-for-18-9-billion-in-cash.html 
[https://perma.cc/M3RE-YA3E].  The transaction represented a new foray into infrastructure software 
for Broadcom. Eric Platt et al., Broadcom to Buy CA Technologies for Nearly $19bn, FIN. TIMES (July 
12, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/c34a8a3e-854b-11e8-96dd-fa565ec55929 
[https://perma.cc/97N5-AHWE].  
92. Press Release, Broadcom, Broadcom Inc. Completes Acquisition of CA Technologies, PR 
NEWS WIRE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/broadcom-inc-completes-
acquisition-of-ca-technologies-300743810.html [https://perma.cc/9AMS-P7XZ].  
93. Michael Martina & Stephen Nellis, Qualcomm Ends $44 Billion NXP Bid After Failing to 
Win China Approval, REUTERS (July 25, 2018, 4:59 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nxp-
semicondtrs-m-a-qualcomm/qualcomm-ends-44-billion-nxp-bid-after-failing-to-win-china-approval-
idUSKBN1KF193 [https://perma.cc/6FZY-LTP4]. 
94. See Jadhav v. Qualcomm Inc., et al., No. 18-cv-01457-AJB-BLM (S.D. Cal. 2018); Camp v. 
Qualcomm Inc., et al., No. 18-cv-01208-AJB-BLM (S.D. Cal. 2018).  
95. Evans v. Qualcomm, Inc. alleged:  
As the latest in a series of entrenchment measures, the incumbent directors 
conspired with protectionist politicians to have the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the U.S. (“CFIUS”) order the last-minute postponement of the 
long-scheduled March 6, 2018 annual meeting of Qualcomm stockholders (the 
“Annual Meeting”), thereby preventing an election of directors that the 
incumbents knew they were going to lose.  
Complaint at ¶ 1, Evans v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 2018-0164, 2018 WL 1224253 (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 
2018).  On April 5, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s notice and proposed order of voluntary 
dismissal. Evans v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 2018-0164-TMR, 2018 WL 1672995 (Del. Ch. Apr. 5, 2018). 
96. Complaint at ¶ 7, Wilcox v. Henderson, No. 2018-0576, 2018 WL 3730056 (Del. Ch. Aug. 
1, 2018). 
97. See Naso, supra note 2 (quoting Mario Mancuso, who leads Kirkland and Ellis LLP’s 
international trade and national security practice as commenting that FIRRMA expanded CFIUS’s 
“jurisdictional box”).  
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Qualcomm was only the fifth transaction to be blocked or unraveled using the 
CFIUS process, the small number of transactions that have reached the point of 
Presidential action is deceptive.  Many other transactions have been deterred by 
CFIUS, which normally informs the parties when it plans to make a negative 
recommendation to the President.98  For example, the effort by Ant Financial, 
a subsidiary of Chinese internet powerhouse Alibaba Group Holding Ltd., to 
acquire U.S. money transfer company MoneyGram International, Inc., 
collapsed in early 2018 when CFIUS made it clear that it would not approve 
the transaction.99  In other transactions, CFIUS has negotiated compromise 
arrangements with the parties and addressed national security concerns through 
security agreements or the divestment of part of the target company.  For 
example, CFIUS required Japan’s SoftBank to give up day-to-day control of 
the private equity business of Fortress Investment Group before approving the 
acquisition in 2017.100  
Prohibiting Broadcom’s attempt to acquire Qualcomm represented the most 
aggressive action by CFIUS and the President to date.  The block occurred 
despite the fact that CFIUS had previously approved Broadcom’s acquisition 
of California-based Brocade Communications Systems Inc.,101 and despite 
Broadcom’s substantial “charm offensive” at the White House.102  The 
 
98. Stephen Heifetz & Evan Abrams, CFIUS History Redux: President Obama Blocks Chinese 
Purchase of Aixtron, Inc., STEPTOE INT’L COMPLIANCE BLOG (Dec. 5, 2016), 
https://www.steptoeinternationalcomplianceblog.com/2016/12/cfius-history-redux-president-obama-
blocks-chinese-purchase-of-aixtron-inc/ [https://perma.cc/EQN9-RGP2].  
99. Greg Roumeliotis, U.S. Blocks MoneyGram Sale to China’s Ant Financial on National 
Security Concerns, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:36 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-
intl-m-a-ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financial-on-national-security-
concerns-idUSKBN1ER1R7 [https://perma.cc/GR5G-AJ8X].  The prospect of a negative CFIUS 
recommendation also scuttled the Dutch company Philipps’ plan to sell 80% of its California-based 
Lumileds lighting division to a consortium of Asian investors. Toby Sterling, U.S. Blocks Philips’ $3.3 
Billion Sale of Lumileds to Asian Buyers, REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2016, 1:02 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philips-lumileds-sale/u-s-blocks-philips-3-3-billion-sale-of-
lumileds-to-asian-buyers-idUSKCN0V02D4 [https://perma.cc/S4LM-23DZ].  
100. Arash Massoudi, SoftBank Waived Day-to-Day Control of Fortress to Win Deal, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f7b3b356-3774-11e8-8b98-2f31af407cc8 
[https://perma.cc/73JT-T785].  
101. On November 17, 2017, Broadcom closed its $5.5 billion acquisition of California-based 
Brocade Communications Systems Inc. after receiving CFIUS approval. Broadcom Closes $5.5 Billion 
Brocade Deal, REUTERS (Nov. 17, 2017, 8:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brocade-
commns-m-a-broadcom/broadcom-closes-5-5-billion-brocade-deal-idUSKBN1DH1T9 
[https://perma.cc/CWQ9-6Z92].  
102. On November 2, 2017, President Trump and Broadcom CEO Hock Tan held a joint press 
conference at the White House during which President Trump announced Broadcom’s decision to 
relocate to the United States. Associated Press, Broadcom Will Move Back to the U.S.–and Bring Tax 
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Broadcom block reflected important developments in CFIUS’s approach and 
the way its processes may be used.103   
B. CFIUS’s Early Years  
Today’s CFIUS is very different from the Committee established by 
President Ford over 30 years ago.104  At that time, members of Congress were 
concerned about increased U.S. investments by Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries105 and CFIUS was established by the Executive branch as 
a way to avoid Congressional imposition of new restrictions106 on foreign 
investment.  Early CFIUS jurisdiction and activity was limited.107  A 1980 U.S. 
House Report complained that the Committee seemed “unable to decide 
whether it should respond to the political or the economic aspects of foreign 
direct investment in the United States.”108  CFIUS activity increased somewhat 
in the 1980s and it investigated a number of foreign investments at the request 
of the Department of Defense.109  These investigations were usually resolved 
by the withdrawal of the foreign acquirer, or the negotiation of changes to the 
proposed transaction that allayed the Committee’s concerns.110   
 
Money With It, Trump Announces, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017, 1:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-broadcom-trump-tax-20171102-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/B5E2-3RD4] (including a picture of President Trump with his arm around Mr. Tan).   
103. See Leiter et al., supra note 49 (“We believe the [Broadcom] Order is reflective of a 
significant change in CFIUS’ perspective on the national security risk of foreign investment in the 
United States and the use of CFIUS to advance the economic aspects of the administration’s national 
security policy.”). 
104. Exec. Order. No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. § 990 (1971–1975). 
105. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2018). 
106. The Operations of Federal Agencies in Monitoring, Reporting on, and Analyzing Foreign 
Investments in the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
96th Cong. 334 (1979) (citing the need to “maintain our traditional liberal policy” at a time when “the 
domestic political situation . . . dictated that some positive action be taken”).  
107. See Exec. Order. No. 11,858, supra note 104 (setting out the monitoring, coordinating, 
recommendation, and reporting responsibilities of the Committee). 
108. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 4 (2018) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 96-1216, pt. 10, at 163–
84 (1980)).  During a Congressional hearing in 1979, one critic said:  
[T]he Committee has been reduced over the last four years to a body that only 
responds to the political aspects or the political questions that foreign investment 
in the United States poses and not with what we really want to know about foreign 
investments in the United States, that is: Is it good for the economy? 
Id.  
109. Id.  
110. Id. at 4–5. 
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
2019] SECURING THE NATION OR ENTRENCHING THE BOARD? 663 
Controversy arose in 1987 with the proposed sale of a U.S. technology 
company, Fairchild Semiconductor Co. (Fairchild), by Schlumberger Ltd. of 
France to Fujitsu Ltd of Japan.  Congress opposed the sale because of strained 
trade relations with Japan; Americans were worried that the United States was 
declining as an international economic power.111  In addition, the Department 
of Defense thought that the transaction would result in foreign control over a 
major supplier of computer chips for the military and thereby weaken U.S. 
defense industries.112  Ultimately bowing to pressure from the Reagan 
Administration, Fujitsu Ltd. and Schlumberger Ltd. called the deal off,113 and 
Fairchild was acquired a few months later by National Semiconductor Corp.114  
Nevertheless, CFIUS’s role had attracted the attention of Congress and the 
public.115   
C. The Exon–Florio Amendment 
In 1988, Congress passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 
1988 which, among other things, included the Exon–Florio Amendment to the 
 
111. “An election year coupled with a rising Federal deficit proved to be the perfect formula for 
starting an avalanche of trade bills in Congress with Japan as the target in many cases.” U.S. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, USITC Pub. 1995, Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, at 4-26 (July 1987), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub1995_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7J36-4394] (discussing 
President Reagan’s announcement that he was taking retaliatory actions against Japan for failing to 
fulfill its commitment under the September 1986 semiconductor agreement); U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, USITC Pub. 2095, at 4-24 (July 1988), 
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/other/2095pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWF4-CLG5] (“There 
were . . . rising concerns about Japanese direct ownership of U.S. companies, buildings, land, and other 
assets.”). 
112. Stuart Auerbach, Cabinet to Weigh Sale of Chip Firm, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 1987), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/1987/03/12/cabinet-to-weigh-sale-of-chip-
firm/63c934e8-0393-43eb-9ca2-a2ccd1d926fe/?utm_term=.6e8bdc9ccd01 [https://perma.cc/3V6J-
CCPH] (“Pentagon planners, already worried by the increased dependence of the U.S. defense industry 
on foreign suppliers for sophisticated electronics, are worried that allowing Fairchild’s technology and 
U.S. distribution network to go to a Japanese company would strengthen that country’s position as a 
global power in the sale and development of high-technology products.”).  
113. SCHLUMBERGER ANNUAL REPORT 34 (1987); David E. Sanger, Japanese Purchase of Chip 
Maker Canceled After Objections in US, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1987, at A1 (noting that “[w]hile the 
[g]overnment had no means of preventing the acquisition, the Pentagon could have denied military 
contracts to the combined Fairchild–Fujitsu concern.”).  
114. Christine Winter, National Semiconductor to Buy Fairchild, CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 1, 1987), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1987-09-01-8703060299-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/5FU9-RHE6].  
115. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 5 (2018). 
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Defense Production Act (Exon–Florio).116  The debate over Exon–Florio 
highlighted Congress’s ambivalence about what should be covered by the law 
and whether the security protected by CFIUS review was to be understood 
narrowly, in strictly defense-related terms, or more broadly, to include more 
economic threats.  The original version of Exon–Florio authorized reviews of 
transactions that threatened “national security and essential commerce,” but it 
was changed when the Reagan Administration threatened to veto the entire 
trade act because of the broad language.117  The Administration objected to 
changing “national security” from a traditional conception of military and 
defense concerns to an economic concept, and “essential commerce” was 
eventually deleted from the text.118   
CFIUS had been established by President Ford through Executive Order, 
but Exon–Florio was Congressional action and, as such, delegated considerable 
additional authority over foreign investment transactions to the President.  After 
Exon–Florio, the President no longer needed to declare a national emergency 
under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act or to get regulators 
to invoke federal antitrust, environmental, or securities laws in order to prohibit 
foreign investment transactions.  At the same time, Exon–Florio was intended 
to keep the commercial nature of investment transactions free from political 
considerations.119   
Exon–Florio granted power to the President and did not mention CFIUS 
directly, but President Reagan immediately delegated authority to administer 
its provisions to the Committee.120  The Treasury Department issued 
implementing regulations in 1991 with procedures for voluntary notification to 
CFIUS by parties to a transaction or by agencies on the Committee, and for 
CFIUS reviews and investigations.121  Thus, CFIUS changed from a primarily 
 
116. The Exon–Florio amendment amended the Defense Production Act. Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107; 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2012).  The 
Exon–Florio amendment was included as Section 5021 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act § 5021, 102 Stat. 1115.  
117. EDWARD M. GRAHAM & DAVID M. MARCHICK, U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 46 (2006). 
118. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 6 (2018). 
119. Id. at 7. 
120. Once the Omnibus Act (including the Exon–Florio amendment) was passed, President 
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,661 delegating his authority to administer the Exon–Florio 
provisions to CFIUS. Exec. Order. No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. § 618 (1989).  Thus, CFIUS is not an 
independent body; it operates under authority of the President and reflects the President’s policies. 
121. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 31 
C.F.R. pt. 800 (2008).  These regulations were subsequently changed by FINSA. Regulations 
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advisory and reporting body into a strategic gatekeeper with power to review, 
investigate, and make recommendations regarding foreign investment into the 
United States.122   
In hindsight, the battle to restrict Exon–Florio’s grant of authority to 
“security” as opposed to “commercial” concerns seems idealistic and perhaps 
somewhat artificial.  Before the September 11 attacks raised profound concerns 
about the international funding of terrorism, and before digital technology 
became both ubiquitous and understood as a security risk, one might consider 
national security to be somewhat separate from commerce.  These days, as the 
blocked Broadcom–Qualcomm transaction illustrates, CFIUS operates in an 
environment in which the economy, and many private commercial actors in the 
economy, are an essential component of national security.   
D. CFIUS Reviews Under Exon–Florio: Aircraft, Ports, and 
Telecommunications  
Two years after the passage of Exon–Florio, CFIUS recommended that 
President Bush order the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 
Corporation (CATIC) to divest its acquisition of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc., 
a Washington state aircraft parts producer.  CATIC, an agent of the Chinese 
Ministry of Aerospace Industry, reportedly had a reputation for circumventing 
trade law to obtain sensitive technologies.123  The President agreed with the 
Committee, and his 1990 Executive Order required CATIC’s divestiture of 
MAMCO within three months.124   
 
Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,702 (Nov. 
21, 2008) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800).  The voluntary nature of filing was debatable, 
even before FIRRMA made certain filings mandatory, because CFIUS member agencies can bring 
transactions before the Committee, potentially resulting in an order of divestment by the President, for 
up to three years after the close of an acquisition. 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(c).  The possibility of after-the-
fact review “introduces an element of business risk that many executives find unacceptable.” Pasco, 
supra note 5, at 356. 
122. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 6 (2018).  CFIUS powers were also increased with the 
1992 Byrd Amendment which required CFIUS investigation when an acquirer was controlled by or 
acting on behalf of a foreign government.  The Byrd Amendment was Section 837(a) of National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993. Pub. L. No. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463–65 (1992).  
123. Jim Mendenhall, Executive Authority to Divest Acquisitions Under the Exon–Florio 
Amendment–The MAMCO Divestiture, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 286, 290 (1991).  
124. George Bush, Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology Import and 
Export Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Incorporated, PRESIDENCY PROJECT 
(Feb. 1, 1990), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/message-the-congress-the-china-
national-aero-technology-import-and-export-corporation [https://perma.cc/V6TR-P7K3].  
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CFIUS did not find itself in the headlines again, however, until November 
of 2005 when Dubai Ports World (DP World), a United Arab Emirates state-
owned company and one of the largest commercial port operators in the world, 
proposed to acquire the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company 
(P&O), a British firm that operated a number of U.S. and other global ports.125  
The proposed transaction would have transferred port operations, although not 
the ports themselves,126 at six U.S. ports.127  Even though neither party was a 
U.S. company, DP World and P&O believed that their transaction might raise 
U.S. national security concerns and so they voluntarily contacted CFIUS in 
advance and informed the Committee that they intended to file a notification.128  
The two companies briefed CFIUS about the transaction, and the Committee 
got an assessment from the U.S. intelligence community about the potential 
national security implications of the transfer of operations at the six U.S. 
ports.129   
On December 16, 2005, DP World and P&O filed their formal notice with 
CFIUS requesting a review, and a month later CFIUS approved the 
transaction.130  Nevertheless, the transaction had attracted significant negative 
U.S. publicity.  Members of Congress were reportedly frustrated with the 
CFIUS approval, and concerned that foreign investment was being pursued by 
foreign state-owned enterprises for questionable objectives.131  On December 
11, 2006, despite the CFIUS approval, DP World sold the U.S. port operations 
to U.S.-owned AIG Global Investment Group.132   
 
125. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the National Security 
in the Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006), https://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/js4071.aspx [https://perma.cc/G6SP-PSET].  
126. Id. 
127. The ports were located in New York/New Jersey, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Miami, Tampa, 
and New Orleans. 
128. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Treasury, supra note 125. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 2 (2018). 
132. AIG lacked any experience in port operations. Press Release, DP World, DP World Enters 
into Agreement to Sell P&O’s U.S. Marine Terminal Operations to AIG Global Investment Group 
(Dec. 11, 2006), http://web.dpworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/11-December-2006-
POPNA_PRESS_RELEASE.pdf (announcing the sale agreement).  AIG took control of the six U.S. 
ports as an investor, with P&O Ports North America still operating them. Robert Malone, Dubai Sells 
U.S. Port Facilities to AIG, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2016, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/2006/12/11/dubai-ports-aig-purchase-biz-logistics-
cx_rm_1211dubai.html#188d65396f7b [https://perma.cc/GK2Y-AV8Z]. 
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Also in 2006, CFIUS approved French telecommunications company 
Alcatel S.A.’s acquisition of U.S. telecommunications company Lucent 
Technologies Inc.133  CFIUS allowed the parties to consummate the transaction 
but imposed conditions: Alcatel had to agree to a National Security Agreement 
and a Special Security Agreement with the U.S. government.134  The National 
Security Agreement restricted Alcatel’s access to sensitive work done by 
Lucent research (Bell Labs) and to the U.S. communications infrastructure.135  
It also provided that CFIUS could reopen its investigation if Alcatel materially 
failed to comply with the agreement.136  The use of security agreements 
increases the uncertainty for foreign acquirers, and a number of groups 
complained.137   
IV. CFIUS GETS STRONGER: THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL 
SECURITY ACT (FINSA) 
A. Congressional Recognition and Increased Jurisdiction  
Concerned about the effectiveness of the CFIUS process, in 2007 Congress 
enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA).138  FINSA 
granted the President more explicit authority to block or suspend proposed or 
pending foreign mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers of U.S. businesses that 
threaten to impair the national security.139  In addition, FINSA formally 
established CFIUS itself, as well as its process for reviewing transactions, in 
statute.140   
 
133. Warren G. Lavey, Telecom Globalization and Deregulation Encounter U.S. National 
Security and Labor Concerns, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 121, 142 (2007). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. 
136. It is unclear if the government has ever reopened a CFIUS determination on this basis.   
137. See Stephanie Kirchgaessner, US Threat to Reopen Terms of Lucent and Alcatel Deal 
Mergers, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2006); Jeremy Pelofsky, Businesses Object to US Move on Foreign 
Investment, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2007, 9:38 AM); Lavey, supra note 133, at 126 (pointing out the costs 
of restricting globalization of the telecom industry, and identifying four telecommunications industry 
policies which conflict with the Alcatel/Lucent security agreement).  
138. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, 121 Stat. 246.  
FINSA added to and strengthened the Exon–Florio amendments to Section 721 of the Defense 
Production Act.  On January 23, 2008, President Bush issued Executive Order 13,456 implementing 
FINSA.  
139. Id. § 6 (replacing the language in Section 721(d) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 
U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1) (2012)). See discussion infra note 159 for a discussion of the definition of 
U.S. Business.   
140. Previously, CFIUS’s existence had been based on President Ford’s 1975 Executive Order. 
Exec. Order No. 11,858, supra note 104. 
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
668 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:643 
FINSA and the Treasury regulations promulgated under the statute the next 
year141 required CFIUS to review a notified “covered transaction” and to 
determine whether (1) the transaction threatens to impair national security; (2) 
the foreign entity is controlled by a foreign government; or (3) the transaction 
would result in the control of any critical infrastructure by or on behalf of any 
foreign person that could impair national security.142   
FINSA defined a “covered transaction” as any proposed, pending or 
completed “merger, acquisition, or takeover” which “could result in foreign 
control of any person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.”143  
In its 2008 Guidance, CFIUS insisted that it “focus[ed] solely on any genuine 
national security concerns raised by a covered transaction, not on other national 
interests.”144   
Despite Treasury Department regulations with safe harbors for investment 
transactions by persons owning less than 10% of a company’s voting 
securities,145 the “control” that triggers a covered transaction was and is both 
uncertain and expansive.146  Under FINSA, control was defined as the power, 
direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, to determine, direct or decide 
matters affecting an entity.147  As practitioners have noted, this control can be 
 
141. Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign Persons, 73 
Fed. Reg. 70,702 (Nov. 21, 2008) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. pt. 800 (2017)).  As the Treasury 
Department explained in its summary of the final rule, the 2008 regulations retained many of the basic 
features of the existing regulations, which were adopted after the enactment of Exon–Florio. Id.  
142. Foreign Investment and National Security Act § 2, 121 Stat. at 248–52; 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170(b)(2)(B)(i) (2012).  
143. Foreign Investment and National Security Act § 2, 121 Stat. at 246–52; 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170(a)(3); 31 C.F.R. § 800.207.  
144. Office of Investment Security; Guidance Concerning the National Security Review 
Conducted by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,567, 74,568 
(Dec. 8, 2008).  
145. 31 C.F.R. § 800.302 (also providing a safe harbor for transactions undertaken directly by 
certain financial companies in the ordinary course of business for their own accounts).   
146. The term is not defined in FINSA itself. 50 U.S.C app. § 2170(a)(2).  However, it is 
explained, with examples, in the Treasury Department Regulations. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204.  
Nevertheless, questions remain. See M&A Guide to CFIUS: How the Review Process Can Impact Your 
Transaction, COOLEY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2017/2017-10-06-ma-
guide-to-cfius-article-1-of-4 [https://perma.cc/5JJ3-TEUF]. 
147. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204 (listing a number of decisions which are included, such as the transfer 
of the entity’s principal assets; reorganization of the entity; substantial alteration of the entity’s 
facilities; major expenditures by the entity; selection of new business ventures for the entity; entry into 
termination or nonfulfillment by the entity of significant contracts; the entity’s policies governing the 
treatment of its nonpublic information; appointment or dismissal of officers or senior managers; 
appointment or dismissal of employees with access to sensitive technology or classified information; 
or amendment of the entity’s organizational documents). 
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achieved by acquisition of a minority ownership interest, board representation, 
or formal or informal voting and other shareholder arrangements.148  Arguably, 
FINSA’s broad conception of control would be achieved early in almost any 
hostile takeover effort.  In the blocked Broadcom attempt to take over 
Qualcomm, for example, CFIUS’s interim order was issued even though 
Broadcom was not a controlling shareholder, and the mostly U.S. board 
nominees Broadcom put forward in its proxy card could only be elected with 
the support of Qualcomm’s mostly U.S. stockholders.149  Although presumably 
Broadcom expected those nominees to promote Qualcomm’s acceptance of 
Broadcom’s offer, the proxy fight itself seemed a stretch for the definition of a 
“covered transaction,” and CFIUS jurisdiction is limited to covered 
transactions.   
Another area of uncertainty is related to “national security.”150  FINSA did 
not define the term, but did clarify that it should be construed to include 
homeland security,151 and added the concepts of “critical infrastructure”152 and 
 
148. See M&A Guide to CFIUS: How the Review Process Can Impact Your Transaction, supra 
note 146.  
149. In Letter to Congress, Broadcom Pledges to Make the U.S. the Global Leader in 5G, supra 
note 76 (arguing that Broadcom had extensive U.S. connections).  
150. The term has not been defined by FINSA, FIRRMA or any of the other CFIUS-related 
measures.  During a review or investigation, each CFIUS member uses the definition consistent with 
that agency’s specific legislative mandate. Briefing by Representatives from the Departments and 
Agencies Represented on the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to 
Discuss the National Security Implications of the Acquisition of Peninsular and Oriental Steamship 
Navigation Company by Dubai Ports World Ports, a Government-Owned and -Controlled Firm of the 
United Arab Emirates: Hearing Before the Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 10 (2008) 
(statement of Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
109shrg32744/html/CHRG-109shrg32744.htm [https://perma.cc/X3DF-4CDG].  
151. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 2, 121 Stat. 
246, 247 (2007); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(5) (including its application to “critical infrastructure”). 
152. Under FINSA there were sixteen “critical infrastructure” sectors: chemical, commercial 
facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense industrial base, emergency services, 
energy, financial services, food and agriculture, government facilities, healthcare and public health, 
information technology, nuclear reactors, materials and waste, transportation systems, water and 
wastewater systems. Critical Infrastructure Sectors, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, 
https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors [https://perma.cc/JD64-H94C] (listing the sixteen 
sectors in place after the 2013 Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience) (last visited July 17, 2018).  FINSA also added the concepts of critical 
industries and key resources to broaden what constitutes critical infrastructure for CFIUS review 
purposes.  Using definitions from the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 and the Homeland Security Act of 
2002, critical industries are “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact 
on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those 
matters.” Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
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“critical technologies” to the extensive list of matters CFIUS and the President 
should consider.153  The Treasury Department regulations under FINSA defined 
“critical infrastructure” as “a system or asset, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of the particular 
system or asset of the entity over which control is acquired pursuant to the 
transaction would have a debilitating impact on national security.”154  “Critical 
technologies” were defined as particular defense articles or services covered by 
U.S. munitions or arms control measures, dual-use items whose export requires 
licensing by the export regulations, nuclear materials or technology, and 
particular agents or toxins.155   
“National security” is a flexible concept that adapts to the changing 
international and national architecture, and in recent CFIUS practice it has been 
unsettled.  In the case of Broadcom’s attempted acquisition of Qualcomm, for 
example, CFIUS identified the possibility that Broadcom’s investment strategy 
would reduce Qualcomm’s research and development spending as a national 
security risk.156   
The pool of parties deemed significant to a transaction also expanded under 
FINSA and its implementing regulations.  A “foreign person” included any 
foreign national, foreign government, foreign entity,157 or any “entity over 
which control is exercised or exercisable by a foreign national, foreign 
government, or foreign entity.”158  Under this definition, a U.S. company could 
 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 1016, 115 Stat. 272, 
401; 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2012).  Key resources are “publicly or privately controlled resources 
essential to the minimal operations of the economy and government.” Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 2, 116 Stat. 2135, 2141; 6 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2012).  
153. After FINSA, the list included, for example, domestic production and industries needed for 
national defense requirements; effects on the sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to a 
country that supports terrorism; effects on U.S. technological leadership; impacts on U.S. critical 
infrastructure; effects on U.S. critical technologies; whether the transaction is a foreign government-
controlled transaction; and long-term U.S. energy and resource requirements. 50 U.S.C. app. 
§ 2170(a)(6) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 800.208 (2017). 
154. 31 C.F.R. § 800.208.   
155. Id. § 800.209.  
156. Interim Order Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Qualcomm, Inc. by Broadcom 
Limited, supra note 48.  
157. A “foreign entity” primarily includes entities organized under the laws of another country 
if their principal place of business is abroad or their securities are primarily traded on foreign 
exchanges.  Although the Treasury Regulations excluded entities that are majority-owned by U.S. 
nationals, that exclusion is not available if the entity is controlled by a foreign person. 31 C.F.R. 
§ 800.212. 
158. Id. § 800.216.  
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be a foreign person if a foreign entity or person has the power (even if unused) 
to control the company.   
FINSA also adopted a broad approach to the U.S. business over which 
foreign control might be exercised.159  Such a person could include, for 
example, a branch or sub-group, or just assets, whether or not organized as a 
separate legal entity.160  Thus the ownership, or country of organization, or 
location of the target company’s headquarters may be disregarded.  If a 
transaction involves target assets that are engaged in U.S. interstate commerce, 
then CFIUS has authority to review the investment.161  There have been a 
number of transactions investigated by CFIUS as impacting U.S. commerce 
even though neither the buyer nor the seller were U.S. companies.162   
Under FINSA, CFIUS review moved beyond the narrow defense-related 
orientation of its first three decades.  By increasing the factors to be considered, 
and adding “critical infrastructure” and a number of more economic 
considerations, FINSA dramatically expanded the scope of transactions to be 
considered by CFIUS.  The consideration of technology-related issues was 
particularly significant in light of the significance of digital technology, and 
data acquisition and manipulation, in almost every sector of the economy.   
B. A Process for Review, Investigation, and Recommendation 
In many cases (e.g., DP World), parties contact CFIUS informally before 
making a notification in order to get feedback and have their transaction 
privately screened.  Once they notify their transaction to the Committee, the 
formal process begins.  FINSA specified procedures for CFIUS consideration 
of transactions, dividing it into three stages: review, investigation, and 
Presidential determination.163   
 
159. Referred to in the statute as a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States.  
Under current CFIUS practice, the government limits its consideration of an entity engaged in interstate 
commerce in the United States to the extent of its activities here.  Although FIRRMA did not 
specifically include that limitation, practitioners believe that it will continue to be respected by the 
Committee in practice. Congress Passes CFIUS Reform Bill, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON 
LLP (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/files/alert-memos-2018/congress-
passes-cfius-reform-bill.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KVM-7LVP].  
160. 31 C.F.R. § 800.226. 
161. M&A Guide to CFIUS: How the Review Process Can Impact Your Transaction, supra note 
146 (noting that, in the Aixtron transaction, the Executive Order included patent interests in the scope 
of Aixtron’s activities in interstate commerce).  
162. See discussion supra Section III.B of Fairchild Semiconductors; Discussion infra Section 
IV.C of Aixtron.  
163. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.501–509. 
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The National Security Review can be triggered by voluntary notification by 
the parties, or by the President, or by any member of CFIUS.164  If, during the 
National Security Review, CFIUS determines that the transaction threatens to 
impair the national security of the United States; that the foreign person is 
controlled by a foreign government; or that the transaction would result in 
control of any critical infrastructure by a foreign person thus impairing national 
security, then CFIUS proceeds to an investigation.165   
During the National Security Investigation, CFIUS and the parties continue 
to work to resolve outstanding issues, and can negotiate mitigation measures 
and develop interim protections.  If CFIUS is satisfied by the investigation 
and/or the measures undertaken by the parties, it may make no recommendation 
to the President.  If, however, the Committee’s concerns are not resolved during 
the investigation, then the Committee may send a negative recommendation to 
the President.166   
The final stage of the CFIUS process is the Presidential Determination.  The 
President may suspend or prohibit proposed or pending foreign acquisitions of 
U.S. businesses that threaten to impair national security.167  The President is not 
obligated to follow a CFIUS recommendation.168   
The parties can withdraw and resubmit their notification anytime during the 
review or investigation, restarting the clock, to obtain extra time to address 
CFIUS’s concerns.169  This withdrawal and resubmission strategy has been 
frequently used by parties and the Committee, although it is expected to abate 
somewhat under FIRRMA’s expanded timetable. 
 
 
 
   
 
164. Before the passage of FINSA, the CFIUS review system was based only on voluntary 
notices to CFIUS by parties to the transactions.  FINSA authorized CFIUS to review a transaction that 
has not voluntarily been notified. See id. § 800.401. 
165. Id. § 800.503.  
166. Id. § 800.506(b). 
167. Id. § 800.101.  
168. The President’s determination is virtually unreviewable, although the Committee’s process 
and actions may be subject to a limited judicial review. See discussion infra Section V.C of Ralls and 
the reviewability of CFIUS decisions. 
169. However, resubmission will trigger additional requirements, and CFIUS has power to 
develop interim protections to address specific concerns pending resubmission; specific time frames 
for resubmitting the notice; or a process for tracking any actions taken by the parties to the transaction. 
31 C.F.R. § 800.507 (fleshing out the provisions of Section 5 of FINSA). 
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C. CFIUS Reviews Under FINSA: Wind Farms, Hogs, Semiconductors, and 
More Semiconductors 
After the Global Financial Crisis, there were significant consolidations in a 
number of sectors and substantial cross-border M&A activity.  CFIUS 
notifications, investigations, and jurisdiction generally increased.170  Exon–
Florio specifically rejected economic concerns as a basis for CFIUS review but, 
after FINSA, CFIUS seemed to consider a broader range of concerns, including 
economic security.171  The result was a substantial number of transactions 
undergoing CFIUS review.  The Committee fielded 143 notices in 2015; 172 in 
2016;172 and 240 in 2017.173  CFIUS now occupies a significant position in the 
U.S. economy and foreign policy and has attracted increasing attention with 
several of its reviews.   
For example, in March 2012, Ralls Corporation (Ralls), a U.S. company 
incorporated in Delaware but owned by two Chinese nationals, purchased 
several other U.S. companies in order to develop wind farms on the land owned 
by the target companies.174  The sites of the proposed wind farms were located 
near a U.S. Navy facility in Oregon.175  Ralls did not file a CFIUS notice before 
purchasing the U.S. companies but, prompted by the U.S. Navy, made the filing 
afterwards.  CFIUS found that the transaction threatened to impair national 
security and, in September 2012, President Obama gave Ralls 90 days to divest 
all its interests in the U.S. companies it had purchased,176 an order that was 
expected to cost Ralls at least $20 million.177   
 
170. COMM. ON FOREIGN INV. U.S. ANN. REP. 3 (2015) https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-
investment/Documents/Unclassified%20CFIUS%20Annual%20Report%20-
%20(report%20period%20CY%202015).pdf [https://perma.cc/ULV7-R7G8] (showing that the 
number of notifications more than doubled between 2009 and 2015).  
171. JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN 
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 19 (2018). 
172. U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, CFIUS: COVERED TRANSACTIONS, WITHDRAWALS, AND 
PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS 2014–2016, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/international/foreign-investment/Documents/CFIUS_Stats_2014-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BJ29-V7LU] (last visited July 21, 2018). 
173. Jonathan Masters & James McBride, Foreign Investment and U.S. National Security, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/foreign-investment-
and-us-national-security [https://perma.cc/GCU3-GEYU].  
174. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 304 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
175. Id. 
176. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the U.S., 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 25 (D.D.C. 2013), 
rev’d and remanded, 758 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
177. Ji Li, Investing Near the National Security Black Hole, 14 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2017). 
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
674 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:643 
This second use of the CFIUS process to prohibit a transaction also 
triggered the only CFIUS lawsuit to date.178  Ralls challenged the order on 
Constitutional due process grounds, arguing that CFIUS failed to provide Ralls 
an opportunity to rebut even unclassified, non-privileged information, and 
thereby violated Ralls’ due process rights.179  Ralls lost at the district court level, 
but in July 2014 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Court ruled in its favor 
on the due process claim in Ralls Corp. v. Committee on Foreign Investment in 
the United States.180  The decision was a procedural victory for Ralls, although 
it notably did not review the national security issue, so the U.S. government’s 
position on the merits (that national security required divestment) was 
unreviewed.181   
The case was subsequently settled, and some commentators have 
speculated that the U.S. government settled because continuing litigation might 
have jeopardized the Committee’s asserted power to issue orders directing 
parties to take actions during the review process.182  Although CFIUS took the 
position that it could issue orders itself, without Presidential backing, FINSA 
had not specifically conferred that authority.  Practitioners questioned CFIUS’s 
authority to issue such orders during the review process, and argued that by 
using this “power,” CFIUS could simply impose its own will during mitigation 
agreement negotiations with parties.183   
In 2013, CFIUS attracted attention again, this time for approving a 
transaction.  The Committee’s swift approval of the purchase of U.S. hog 
supplier Smithfield Foods, Inc., by China’s largest pork producer, Shuanghui 
International,184 again raised the question of what constitutes “security.”  It was, 
 
178. Stephen Heifetz, Ralls and U.S. Government Settle Only CFIUS Suit in History, STEPTOE 
INT’L COMPLIANCE BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://www.steptoeinternationalcomplianceblog.com/2015/10/ralls-and-u-s-government-settle-only-
cfius-suit-in-history/ [https://perma.cc/W397-NC8D]. 
179. Id. 
180. 758 F.3d at 296. 
181. Heifetz, supra note 178 (noting that “[n]either the district court nor the appeals court 
indicated any interest in second-guessing the [government’s] national security views.”).  
182. Judy Wang, Note, Ralls Corp. v. CFIUS: A New Look at Foreign Direct Investments to the 
US, 54 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. BULL. 30, 54 (2016) (“Settling . . . was a tactical decision that 
benefited both parties.  CFIUS, realizing that its core powers to issue orders stood to be diluted, feared 
a district court’s judgment of the issues on the merits.”). 
183. Heifetz, supra note 178 (arguing that if CFIUS has this power, these are no longer real 
negotiations).   
184. See Press Release, Smithfield Foods, Shuanghui International and Smithfield Foods 
Receive CFIUS Clearance (Sept. 6, 2013), https://www.smithfieldfoods.com/newsroom/press-
releases-and-news/shuanghui-international-and-smithfield-foods-receive-cfius-clearance 
[https://perma.cc/Y48N-FQZ9]. 
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at the time, the largest acquisition in history by a Chinese company of a U.S. 
counterpart,185 and a number of U.S. Senators from midwestern farming states 
asserted that the transaction would endanger U.S. food security.186  
Nevertheless, CFIUS maintained a narrower conception of security.   
The third prohibition of a foreign investment transaction using the CFIUS 
review process came in 2016, when President Obama prevented the acquisition 
of Aixtron SE.187  Although Aixtron SE was a German technology company, it 
had a U.S. subsidiary, Aixtron Inc., that would have been acquired as part of 
the deal.188  CFIUS objected only to the acquisition of the U.S. subsidiary, but 
it was clear that the transaction could not proceed without that subsidiary, which 
accounted for about 20% of the German parent company’s value.189  The 
acquirer in the transaction was another German company, Grand Chip 
Investment GMBH, but CFIUS found that Grand Chip was ultimately 
controlled by GC Investment of Luxembourg and Fujian Grand Chip 
Investment Fund, a Chinese limited partnership.190  The President highlighted 
the control exercised by Fujian Grand Chip and its partners in his Executive 
Order prohibiting the transaction.191   
The Aixtron block reflected a broad view of CFIUS’s jurisdiction.  To begin 
with, CFIUS blocked a non-U.S. company’s acquisition of another non-U.S. 
company.  In addition, CFIUS focused on the (Chinese) identity of the upstream 
ownership of the potential acquirer.192  In October 2017, CFIUS approved the 
sale of part of Aixtron’s semiconductor business to Eugene Technology Co., a 
South Korean company.193  Finally, the President’s Executive Order included 
 
185. Michael J. de la Merced & David Barboza, Needing Pork, China Is to Buy a U.S. Supplier, 
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 29, 2013, 7:51 AM), 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/smithfield-to-be-sold-to-shuanghui-group-of-china/ 
[https://perma.cc/U3L5-M665].  
186. Ros Krasny & Rachelle Younglai, U.S. Lawmakers Air Concerns About Smithfield–
Shuanghui Deal, REUTERS (June 5, 2013, 10:20 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-smithfield-
shuanghui-congress/u-s-lawmakers-air-concerns-about-smithfield-shuanghui-deal-
idUSBRE9540YN20130605 [https://perma.cc/8FC8-CN2J].   
187. Order of December 2, 2016 Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of a Controlling Interest 
in Aixtron SE by Grand Chip Investment GmbH, 81 Fed. Reg. 88,607 (Dec. 7, 2016). 
188. Id. 
189. Heifetz & Abrams, supra note 98. 
190. Id.  
191. Order of December 2, 2016 Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of a Controlling Interest 
in Aixtron SE by Grand Chip Investment GmbH, supra note 187. 
192. Id. 
193. See M&A Guide to CFIUS: Deciding Whether to Submit Voluntarily to CFIUS Review, 
COOLEY (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2018/2018-02-27-ma-guide-to-cfius 
[https://perma.cc/46BQ-HMAN].  
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interests in patents issued by or pending with the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office as part of Aixtron, Inc.’s U.S. business.194  An expansion to intellectual 
property could sweep a large number of foreign company acquisitions of other 
foreign companies into the CFIUS net based on U.S. subsidiaries or sales 
offices, although proposed provisions allowing CFIUS to review certain 
transfers of U.S. intellectual property were not included in the final version of 
FIRRMA.195   
The fourth time a U.S. President prohibited an acquisition based on CFIUS 
national security concerns came in 2017, when President Trump blocked the 
acquisition of a U.S. company, Lattice Semiconductor Corp., by the Chinese-
backed investment fund Canyon Bridge Capital Partners.196  On September 1, 
2017, the parties announced that CFIUS had informed them that it intended to 
make a negative recommendation regarding the transaction,197 but the two 
parties made a direct appeal to the President anyway.198  The President blocked 
the transaction on September 13, 2017.199   
D. CFIUS Stretches Under FINSA: Broadcom and Qualcomm 
In comparison to prior practice, the years up to the prohibition of 
Broadcom’s attempted takeover of Qualcomm and the passage of FIRRMA 
featured a greater number of CFIUS filings, longer review periods for most 
 
194. Order of December 2, 2016 Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of a Controlling Interest 
in Aixtron SE by Grand Chip Investment GmbH, supra note 187. 
195. See Naso, supra note 2 (explaining that the application to intellectual property was a point 
of disagreement in negotiations over FIRRMA, and intellectual property was ultimately removed from 
the legislation); see also David J. Levine et al., Expected Legislation Amending CFIUS Will Affect a 
Broad Range of Foreign Investments in US Businesses, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (July 11, 2018), 
https://www.mwe.com/insights/legislation-amend-cifus-foreign-invest-is-business/ 
[https://perma.cc/DKK8-YG8M] (previewing the FIRRMA legislation).   
196. Kate O’Keeffe, Trump Blocks China-Backed Fund from Buying Lattice Semiconductor, 
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2017, 7:38 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-blocks-china-backed-
fund-from-buying-u-s-chip-maker-lattice-1505335670 [https://perma.cc/7S5P-X8U4].   
197. Lattice Semiconductor Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 1, 2017) (disclosing that 
CFIUS had indicated that it would recommend that the President suspend or prohibit the proposed 
merger with Canyon Bridge).  
198. O’Keeffe, supra note 196. 
199. Order of September 13, 2017 Regarding the Proposed Acquisition of Lattice Semiconductor 
Corporation by China Venture Capital Fun Corporation Limited, 82 Fed. Reg. 43,665 (Sept. 18, 2017). 
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transactions,200 and increased risks.201  Practitioners noted that CFIUS routinely 
looked at transactions that, although they did not qualify for the under-10% 
ownership safe harbor, still did not seem to involve “control” by a foreign 
person.202  A number of transactions, especially those involving technology, 
were withdrawn or abandoned when it became clear that CFIUS approval 
would not be forthcoming.  In 2017, for example, China-based NavInfo Co., 
Ltd. abandoned its acquisition of Netherlands-based International B.V., a 
digital mapping company; Hong Kong and China-based T.C.L. Industries 
Holdings (H.K.) Limited and Jade Ocean Global Limited gave up their 
acquisition of U.S.-based Inseego Corp.’s Novatel Wireless MiFi business; and 
a subsidiary of China-based HNA Group abandoned its acquisition of 9.9% of 
the stock of Global Eagle Entertainment, a U.S. media connectivity company.203  
As mentioned above, in early 2018 Ant Financial gave up its $1.2 billion effort 
to purchase MoneyGram when it became clear that CFIUS approval would not 
be forthcoming.204   
The actions of CFIUS and the President in connection with Broadcom’s 
attempted Qualcomm acquisition, however, demonstrated an even more 
aggressive approach.  The Broadcom block established that CFIUS reviews can 
be used for more than the government’s defense-related foreign policy or 
national security purposes.  The CFIUS process was clearly available to target 
companies as an antitakeover device in the global M&A marketplace.205   
Without CFIUS, the Broadcom–Qualcomm situation was simple: two large 
high-technology companies, both publicly traded in the U.S. markets, engaged 
in the familiar M&A ritual of the hostile takeover attempt.  Hostile takeovers 
and proxy fights have long been a part of the U.S. economy, and we have 
developed extensive legal doctrines to manage such struggles for control in 
ways that are both fair to the participants and in society’s interest.  The 
deployment of CFIUS review as an antitakeover device by Qualcomm 
 
200. Adam O. Emmerich & Robin Panovka, Wachtell Offers 2018 Checklist for Cross-Border 
M&A Involving U.S. Targets, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Jan. 10, 2018), 
http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/01/10/wachtell-offers-2018-checklist-for-cross-border-ma-
of-u-s-targets/ [https://perma.cc/6U4V-MWDE].  
201. Chuck Comey & Mike O’Bryan, Assessing Acquisition Offers from Chinese Buyers, 
DIRECTORS & BOARDS (July 25, 2016), https://www.directorsandboards.com/articles/singleassessing-
acquisition-offers-chinese-buyers [https://perma.cc/ZK55-HF2H].  
202. Congress Passes CFIUS Reform Bill, supra note 159. 
203. Foreign Investment and Acquisitions: CFIUS Considerations for Deals in 2018, WINSTON 
& STRAWN LLP (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/foreign-investment-
and-acquisitions-cfius-considerations-for.html [https://perma.cc/5XGJ-VTBK]. 
204. Granville, supra note 23. 
205. Id. 
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constituted a new weapon in merger battles, and with the passage of FIRRMA 
that weapon became very powerful.   
V. CFIUS GETS EVEN STRONGER: FIRRMA 
A. Cementing the Aggressive Approach 
On August 13, 2018, President Trump signed the John S. McCain National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA) which included 
FIRRMA.206  FIRRMA codified many of the expansions of CFIUS jurisdiction 
that had developed since the passage of FINSA, and cemented the 
government’s “relatively aggressive approach”207 to reviews of foreign 
investment.   
Significantly, FIRRMA expanded the universe of “covered transactions” 
over which CFIUS has jurisdiction beyond mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers 
which result in foreign control of U.S. businesses.208  Partially in recognition of 
CFIUS’s existing practice of reviewing investments that fall short of majority 
control, FIRRMA added a variety of non-controlling foreign investments to the 
covered transactions subject to CFIUS review.   
FIRRMA expanded covered transactions to include “other investments” by 
a foreign person in any unaffiliated U.S. business209 that operates in the critical 
infrastructure or critical technologies spaces, or that maintains or collects 
sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens that may be exploited in a manner that 
threatens national security.210  FIRRMA defined an “other investment” as a 
direct or indirect investment by a foreign person in a U.S. business that does 
 
206. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, §§ 1701–28, 132 Stat. 1636–2207 (2018).  Much of FIRRMA was effective immediately, but the 
legislation delayed applicability of several key provisions relating to, for example, the expansion of 
covered transactions to non-controlling and real estate investments until the earlier of eighteen months 
or thirty days after the Treasury Department issues implementing regulations. See id. § 1727, 132 Stat. 
at 2206–07 (specifying which provisions take effect immediately, and which are delayed). 
207. Congress Passes CFIUS Reform Bill, supra note 159. 
208. The FINSA approach to “persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States” was 
adopted in FIRRMA. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a)(3) (2012); 31 C.F.R. § 800.207 (2017).  Although 
FIRRMA does not explicitly restrict the definition of a person “engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States” to the extent of the person’s activities in the United States, that understanding of the 
limitation of CFIUS jurisdiction is considered to be still applicable. Congress Passes CFIUS Reform 
Bill, supra note 159.  
209. U.S. business is defined in FIRRMA as a person engaged in interstate commerce in the 
United States. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 § 1703, 132 
Stat. at 2183 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(13)). 
210. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2178 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iii)). 
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not constitute foreign control, but that affords the foreign person (1) access to 
material non-public technical information211 in possession of the U.S. business; 
(2) membership or observer rights on the board of directors, or the right to 
nominate a board member, of the U.S. business; or (3) any involvement (other 
than voting shares) in the substantive decision making of the U.S. business 
regarding sensitive personal data, critical technologies, or critical 
infrastructure.212   
In addition, FIRRMA broadened the definition of “covered transactions” 
by adding acquisitions of interests in real estate parcels that are either part of 
U.S. ports, or close to U.S. military or other government facilities that are 
sensitive for national security reasons.213  FIRRMA also expanded “covered 
transactions” to include changes in rights that a foreign person has with respect 
to a U.S. business214 and transactions structured in ways to circumvent the 
application of CFIUS’s review process.215   
Despite the expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction to an array of non-controlling 
investments, FIRRMA clarified that foreign investors may still have certain 
consultation rights with respect to their passive indirect investments through 
funds managed by a U.S general partner without falling under the new “other 
investment” rules.216  A foreign investor may participate on an advisory board 
or committee of such a fund as long as the board or committee does not control 
the investment decisions of the fund, and as long as the foreign investor cannot 
control investment decisions of the fund, determine the appointment or 
compensation of the general partner, or obtain access to material nonpublic 
technical information via the board or committee.217   
 
211. FIRRMA defined “material non-public technical information” as information about critical 
infrastructure or critical technologies that is not in the public domain.  Financial information regarding 
the performance of a U.S. business was excluded from the definition. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2179 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(ii)). 
212. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(i)). 
213. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2177–78 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(ii)). 
214. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2178 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(iv)).  
215. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(B)(v)).  FIRRMA also included certain 
transfers pursuant to bankruptcy proceedings. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2181 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. § 4565 (a)(4)(F)). 
216. Id. § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2180–81 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(iv)). 
217. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(4)(D)(iv)).  The scope of the passive 
investment exemptions in FIRRMA are very narrow. Jeffrey Bialos & Mark Herlach, How FIRRMA 
Will Change National Security Reviews: Part 1, LAW360 (Aug. 16, 2018, 3:14 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1073822/how-firrma-will-change-national-security-reviews-part-1 
[https://perma.cc/862T-N77L].  Any role beyond simple financial rights is likely to trigger the “other 
investment” rules. Id.  
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FIRRMA also continued the trend of focusing on critical technology and 
infrastructure.  Most importantly, it expanded the definition of “critical 
technologies” to include new categories of “emerging and foundational 
technologies” that are essential to U.S. national security.218  Emerging and 
foundational technologies are controlled pursuant to the Export Control Reform 
Act of 2018, a companion law to FIRRMA that was passed at the same time.219   
In its explanation of the “Sense of Congress on Consideration of Covered 
Transactions,” FIRRMA stated that CFIUS may consider a number of other 
factors.  That list includes, for example, whether the transaction involves a 
country of possible concern; the potential national security implications of 
cumulative control of or a pattern of recent transactions involving a type of 
critical infrastructure or technology by a foreign government or person; and the 
extent to which a covered transaction is likely to expose personally identifiable 
information or other sensitive data of U.S. citizens to access by foreign 
governments or persons in a manner that threatens national security.220   
B. Expanding the Process and Enforcement 
Procedurally, FIRRMA added a Declaration process, pursuant to which 
parties may file a short-form notice with “basic information”221 before a full 
notification.  Based on the Declaration, CFIUS may request that the parties file 
a full notice; inform the parties that it cannot make a determination based on 
the information it has received; initiate a unilateral review of the transaction; or 
clear the transaction.222   
 
218. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1703, 132 Stat. at 2181–82 (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(6)) (referring to the technologies controlled pursuant to Section 
1758 of the Export Control Reform Act of 2018, which was also included in the NDAA).  
219. Id. § 1758, 132 Stat. at 2218–23 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A § 4817 (West 2018)) 
(setting up an interagency process to identify emerging and foundational technologies that are essential 
for U.S. national security).  
220. H.R. REP. NO. 115-874, at 540–608 (2018) (Conf. Rep.).  
221. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1706, 132 Stat. at 2184 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(I)).  Practitioners have pointed out, however, that the amount 
of information requested by the Committee in such Declarations will produce filings much longer than 
five pages. See CFIUS Introduces Pilot Program for Mandatory Declarations of Critical Technology 
Investments, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/cfius-introduces-pilot-
program-for-mandatory-declarations-of-critical-technology-investments [https://perma.cc/82Y8-
UPS5]. 
222. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1706, 132 Stat. at 2184 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(III)).  
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
2019] SECURING THE NATION OR ENTRENCHING THE BOARD? 681 
FIRRMA made some Declaration filings mandatory, a change from the 
prior system which relied on either voluntary party notification or initiation by 
CFIUS itself.  Filing a Declaration is mandatory when a foreign person in which 
a foreign government owns a substantial interest acquires a substantial interest 
in a U.S. business that is associated with critical infrastructure, critical 
technologies, or sensitive personal data of U.S. persons.223   
FIRRMA also provided for future regulations mandating filing of 
Declarations when transactions involve critical technologies, regardless of 
whether a foreign government is involved.224  Less than three months later, 
CFIUS introduced a Pilot Program for such critical technologies-related 
Declarations.225  Interim Regulations issued on October 11, 2018 mandated 
Declarations for certain non-controlling investments by foreign persons in U.S. 
businesses in any of 27 industries involved in critical technologies.226  The 27 
industries, included in an annex to the rule, range from “Aircraft 
Manufacturing” to “Turbine and Turbine Generator Set Units Manufacturing,” 
and also include industries relating to semiconductors, telephone apparatus 
manufacturing, navigation systems, and communication equipment.227   
These Declarations, added to FIRRMA’s extension of the timetables for 
reviews and investigations may help alleviate the need for the withdrawal and 
refiling practice common in more complex cases.228   
FIRRMA updated CFIUS’s enforcement powers, codifying many of the 
Committee’s existing practices and providing some additional tools.  For 
example, FIRRMA authorized CFIUS to suspend a proposed or pending 
covered transaction while it is undergoing the National Security Review or 
National Security Investigation process.229  It also authorized CFIUS to refer a 
 
223. Id. § 1706, 132 Stat. at 2185 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(bb)).  
224. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(b)(1)(C)(v)(IV)(cc)).  
225. For a basic summary of the Pilot Program from a practitioner’s perspective, see CFIUS 
Introduces Pilot Program for Mandatory Declarations of Critical Technology Investments, supra note 
221. 
226. Determination and Temporary Provisions Pertaining to a Pilot Program to Review Certain 
Transactions Involving Foreign Persons and Critical Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 51,322, 51,322–23 
(Oct. 11, 2018) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. pt. 801 et seq. (2017)).  The pilot program took 
effect a month later, on November 10, 2018. Id. at 51,322.  
227. Id. at 51,333 (codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 801, Annex A).   
228. National Security Reviews are extended to forty-five days (instead of thirty) and a fifteen-
day extension possibility has been added to the forty-five-day National Security Investigations. John 
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1709, 132 Stat. at 2187–88 (codified as amended at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 4565(b)(1)(F), (b)(2)(C)).   
229. Id. § 1718, 132 Stat. at 2193 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(1)).   
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transaction to the President at any time during the process.230  If a party to a 
covered transaction voluntarily abandons the transaction, CFIUS may 
negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with a 
party in order to effectuate the abandonment and mitigate the risk to national 
security that arises as a result of the transaction.231  FIRRMA increased 
CFIUS’s ability to negotiate, enter into or impose, and enforce mitigation 
agreements with parties to completed transactions.232  In recognition of the 
growing docket of prior mitigation agreements, FIRRMA clarified CFIUS’s 
power to impose measures when parties do not comply, and required periodic 
review of past agreements.233   
C. Review of CFIUS Decisions 
In FINSA, Congress specified that the actions and findings of the President 
under the review process “shall not be subject to judicial review.”234  FIRRMA 
did not disturb that statutory prohibition, but added that CFIUS actions or 
findings may only be challenged in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit.235  The contrast with other statutes and administrative actions is sharp.  
If a foreign investment is prevented using, for example, the Export 
Administration Act236 or the Department of the Treasury’s sanctions 
 
230. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(2)).  
231. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(3)(A)(ii)).  
232. Id. § 1718, 132 Stat. at 2194 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(3)(A)(iii)).   
233. Id. (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(l)(3)(B)).   
234. Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-49, § 6, 121 Stat. 
246, 256 (replacing the language in Section 721(d) of the Defense Production Act of 1950) (codified 
as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)) (slightly amended to add a heading and new numbering by 
FIRRMA). 
235. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act § 1715, 132 Stat. at 2191 (codified as 
amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4565(e)(2)).   
236. The Export Administration Act authorizes the President to restrict exports of goods and 
technologies that have both civilian and military (so-called dual use) applications. 50 U.S.C. 
§ 2405(a)(1) (2012).  Under the Export Administration Regulations, the Department of Commerce has 
established an extensive licensing regime to prevent the transfer of sensitive technologies to certain 
foreign parties. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730–74 (2018). 
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programs,237 both of which entail national security issues, there are clear 
methods for substantive judicial review.238   
The CFIUS process, however, differs substantially from these other 
mechanisms for controlling acquisition transactions, and from traditional 
takeover defenses.  A party’s ability to challenge or appeal the CFIUS decision 
is limited.  Even post-Ralls, companies have little hope of challenging the 
substantive determination of CFIUS and the President.  And shareholders may 
have even less success.  As demonstrated by shareholder litigation in response 
to collapse of the Broadcom–Qualcomm deal,239 shareholders have the option 
to file securities lawsuits based on disclosure violations or derivative suits 
alleging board fiduciary duty violations, but their remedies against the target 
corporation may be slim and those suits have no impact on the fundamental 
outcome: prohibition of the acquisition.  This lack of reviewability may 
exacerbate the challenges posed by managers’ use of the CFIUS process to 
ward off unsolicited takeover offers.   
As a result, the target company board may only need to persuade CFIUS of 
the possibility of national security concerns.  Judging from the government’s 
 
237. The United States Department of the Treasury, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) in its Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, promulgates and enforces measures that 
prohibit transactions with particular countries or individuals. See OFAC FAQs: General Questions, 
U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_general.aspx#basic [https://perma.cc/QM5R-B6DK] (last visited July 
21, 2018).  These “sanctions” include licensing requirements and asset freezes and are primarily 
imposed through the President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–06 (2012).  OFAC sanctions have been occasionally supplemented by direct 
Congressional action. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 6021 (2012)); Comprehensive Iran 
Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
238. For example, the Export Control Regulations are enforced by the Department of 
Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security, and their determinations are reviewable first 
administratively and then to federal court when the appeals process is exhausted. 15 C.F.R. § 756.1 
(2018); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2412(c) (2012).  OFAC licensing decisions and sanctions violation 
determinations are also reviewable by federal courts. See, e.g., Epsilon Elecs., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, 857 F.3d 913, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (appealing OFAC’s decision to impose a penalty on 
Epsilon Electronics for violation of the Iran sanctions).  Antitrust enforcement decisions by the 
Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission may be challenged by parties in federal courts. 
See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 81 (1911) (finding that Standard Oil Company 
had violated the Sherman Act).  Decisions made by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
relating to proxy fights may also be reviewed by federal courts. See, e.g., Lovenheim v. Iroquois 
Brands, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 554, 554–55 (D.D.C. 1985) (evaluating a company’s decision to exclude a 
shareholder’s proposal from the proxy materials). 
239. See discussion supra Section II.E.  
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boosterish presentation of Qualcomm and its incumbent management in its 
March 5, 2018 letter to Broadcom’s attorneys, and the government’s 
willingness to attribute the most negative motivations to Broadcom, an acquirer 
with foreign connections may be at a considerable disadvantage.  If they were 
to become common, such government prohibitions might reallocate 
considerable power to incumbent management in cases with international 
connections.  The current volume of cross-border M&A renders that shift in 
power broadly significant.  And with the limited judicial review of 
CFIUS/Presidential determinations, there is little third-party assurance that a 
decision to protect incumbent management is in the interests of either 
shareholders or the public.   
VI. MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CFIUS 
A. Context: A Strong Global Merger Market 
Even without Broadcom’s attempted takeover of Qualcomm, 2018 was a 
very strong year for mergers and acquisitions.240  Unsurprisingly, many large 
transactions were seen as “technology” deals.241  For example, 2018 deals 
included the Sprint Corp.-T-Mobile merger agreement;242 Walt Disney’s 
agreement to purchase entertainment assets from 21st Century Fox;243 Cigna’s 
 
240. Eric Platt, Global M&A Activity Hits New High, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/b7e67ba4-c28f-11e8-95b1-d36dfef1b89a  [https://perma.cc/AM87-
SWZE] (noting that global activity in the first nine months of 2018 set a new record).   
241. Dana Mattioli & Dana Cimilluca, Hot M&A Market Is on Pace for a Record, WALL ST. J., 
July 2, 2018, at R1; DELOITTE, THE STATE OF THE DEAL: M&A TRENDS 2018, at 2 (2017), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/mergers-acqisitions/us-mergers-
acquisitions-2018-trends-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN8Y-G4B7] (identifying technology 
acquisition as “the No. 1 driver of M&A pursuits” in 2018). 
242. Press Release, T-Mobile, T-Mobile and Sprint to Combine, Accelerating 5G Innovation & 
Increasing Competition (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.t-mobile.com/news/5gforall 
[https://perma.cc/EHJ2-82F5].  There is currently an effort in the U.S. House of Representatives to 
trigger a CFIUS review of the transaction, based on the ties between Sprint’s owner, SoftBank Group 
Corp., and the Chinese company Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. Elise Reuter, Sprint/T-Mobile Merger 
May Face Obstacle with SoftBank’s Chinese Ties, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (July 7, 2018, 2:17 PM), 
https://www.bizjournals.com/kansascity/news/2018/07/07/sprint-tmobile-committee-on-foreign-
investment.html [https://perma.cc/5REC-QTME].  CFIUS approved SoftBank’s purchase of Sprint in 
2013. Id.  T-Mobile is primarily owned by German companies. Id. 
243. Press Release, The Walt Disney Company, The Walt Disney Company Signs Amended 
Acquisition Agreement to Acquire Twenty-First Century Fox, Inc., for $71.3 Billion in Cash and Stock 
(June 20, 2018), https://www.thewaltdisneycompany.com/the-walt-disney-company-signs-amended-
acquisition-agreement-to-acquire-twenty-first-century-fox-inc-for-71-3-billion-in-cash-and-stock 
[https://perma.cc/7NMH-XWCZ].  The acquisition is reportedly to meet the competitive threat from 
streaming video services from Amazon.com Inc. and Netflix. Cynthia Littleton & Brian Steinberg, 
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agreement to buy pharmacy-benefit manager Express Scripts Holding Co.;244 
CVS Health Corp.’s efforts to acquire Aetna;245 Japan’s Takeda 
Pharmaceutical’s purchase of Irish pharmaceutical company Shire Plc;246 and 
AT&T’s agreement to purchase Time Warner.247   
A substantial portion of contemporary M&A transactions also involve 
hostile or unsolicited bids.248  In 2017, 15% of total global M&A volume 
resulted from unsolicited offers.249  Although many transactions were 
successful, many targets besides Qualcomm successfully defended themselves, 
or used defenses to negotiate better terms.250  The impact of such defensive 
 
Disney to Buy 21st Century Fox Assets for $52.4 Billion in Historic Hollywood Merger, VARIETY (Dec. 
14, 2017, 4:04 AM), https://variety.com/2017/biz/news/disney-fox-merger-deal-52-4-billion-merger-
1202631242/ [https://perma.cc/D548-BWSP] (discussing the fact that the deal will include 21st 
Century Fox’s “innovative distribution platforms”). 
244. Press Release, Cigna, Cigna to Acquire Express Scripts for $67 Billion (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.cigna.com/newsroom/news-releases/2018/cigna-to-acquire-express-scripts-for-67-
billion [https://perma.cc/7AGY-W7YC] (discussing the fact that Express Scripts is a leader in 
“technology-powered clinical solutions”). 
245. Press Release, CVS Health, CVS Health to Acquire Aetna; Combination to Provide 
Consumers with a Better Experience, Reduced Costs and Improved Access to Health Care Experts in 
Homes and Communities Across the Country (Dec. 3, 2017), https://cvshealth.com/newsroom/press-
releases/cvs-health-acquire-aetna-combination-provide-consumers-better-experience 
[https://perma.cc/BZ5Y-ESPY] (praising the combination of the CVS human touch with Aetna’s 
“analytics”). 
246. David Meyer, Takeda Finally Inks a Deal to Buy Shire in One of the Biggest Pharma 
Takeovers Ever, FORTUNE (May 8, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/08/takeda-buys-shire-62-
billion-pharma/ [https://perma.cc/RLK9-CQMF] (making Takeda a major player in the 
biopharmaceutical industry). 
247. The AT&T–Time Warner transaction was approved by the D.C. District Court in June 2018. 
United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 17-2511, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100023, at *1 (D.D.C. June 12, 
2018).  The Department of Justice filed a notice of appeal with the D.C. Circuit on July 12, 2018. 
Notice of Appeal, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:17-cv-02511-RJL (D.D.C. July 12, 2018). 
248. Brownstein et al., supra note 13.  
249. Id. (including the Broadcom offer).   
250. One example of a successful defense was Rockwell Automation’s resistance to Emerson 
Electric’s unsolicited bids.  Arguing that the Emerson offers undervalued the company and would 
create problems for the company’s customers, the Rockwell board rejected three offers from Emerson 
during the course of 2017, and in November 2017 Emerson abandoned its pursuit. See Greg 
Roumeliotis, Rockwell Automation Rebuffs Emerson’s Latest $29 Billion Bid, REUTERS (Nov. 22, 
2017, 6:22 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rockwell-automat-m-a-emerson-
electric/rockwell-automation-rebuffs-emersons-latest-bid-idUSKBN1DM1EY 
[https://perma.cc/77JA-C3AP]; Arunima Banerjee & Sanjana Shivdas, Emerson Electric Pulls 
Rockwell Automation Bid Off Table, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2017, 6:06 AM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-rockwell-automat-m-a-emerson-electric/emerson-electric-pulls-
rockwell-automation-bid-off-table-idUSKBN1DS1EO [https://perma.cc/BK9G-G2XJ].  
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tactics, and the terms under which they should be deployed, is often the subject 
of debate and litigation.   
B. The Market for Corporate Control and the Agency Problem  
1. The Market for Corporate Control 
In a series of articles published in the 1960s, Henry Manne argued that 
mergers, acquisitions and takeovers, including hostile ones, can have important 
benefits both for corporate governance and for society as a whole.251  The idea 
behind Manne’s “market for corporate control”252 is that a poorly managed 
corporation will have a lower share price.  A potential acquirer that believes 
(perhaps correctly) that it can better manage the target corporation will have an 
incentive to purchase stock and gain control of the target corporation.  The 
acquirer will then have the power to institute changes that improve management 
and increase the value (and thus share price) of the target corporation.253   
At that point, Manne argued, shareholders benefit from the increase in the 
target company’s value and the concomitant increase in either the value of the 
shares they hold, if they are not bought out, or the above-market cash payment, 
if they are bought out.  In addition, society gains from the improved 
performance of the target company.254  The acquirer also benefits from its more 
valuable investment which it can, if it chooses, then resell at a profit.   
Even more importantly from the perspective of political economy, Manne 
noted that the market for corporate control functions even when acquisitions 
 
251. See generally Henry G. Manne, “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 399 (1962); Henry G. Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay 
in Honor of Adolf A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market 
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965); Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: 
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967); Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—
A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231.  For a comprehensive treatment of Professor 
Manne’s impact on legal scholarship, see William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate 
Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999) (discussing 
all five of Professor Manne’s articles published during this period, and providing anecdotal, doctrinal, 
and empirical evidence of their impact). 
252. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, supra note 251, at 112 (most 
commonly associated with the phrase); Manne, “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, supra 
note 251, at 412 (actually introducing the phrase). 
253. See Manne, “Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation, supra note 251, at 412; Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, supra note 251, at 114–15. 
254. But see Caleb N. Griffin, The Hidden Cost of M&A, 2018 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 70, 72–73 
(arguing that most of the gains from M&A can be attributed to market power increases which may 
raise costs and ultimately harm consumers and society, not from efficiency increases). 
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are not made, through deterrence.255  The potential for takeover disciplines the 
target managers and incentivizes them to act in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, and by extension (assuming one believes in 
markets) for society as a whole.   
2. The Agency Problem 
The “market for corporate control” via the buying and selling of voting 
shares, however, is not a free market.  The incumbent managers of the target 
company have significant capacity and incentives to defend the company and 
themselves.  Managers are often assured of adverse personal repercussions from 
a successful hostile bid (which, after all, is premised on the assumption that 
management can be improved with new control), and so managers’ interest in 
maintaining the status quo is both clear and potentially antithetical to that of 
shareholders seeking to benefit from a profitable opportunity/sale.  “Directors 
may reject a merger offer out of concern for the terms of the offer or out of 
concerns that a new majority shareholder will negatively impact the directors’ 
own positions or those of management,” at which time the potential acquirer 
may seek to make a hostile tender offer directly to the shareholders.256   
The hostile acquisition of a company thus illustrates what has come to be 
called the “agency problem” in corporate law.  Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner 
Means published The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932,257 
corporation law has focused on the problems created by the separation of 
ownership (by shareholders) and control (by managers) in the corporation.  As 
one commentator has explained, “[b]ecause of the vacuum created by the 
separation of ownership from control, management of many large corporations 
has become self-perpetuating.”258  Since managers are in control, they can 
thwart takeovers by adopting measures that might not be in the interests of 
shareholders.  On the other hand, and to make matters more complex, the power 
of the corporate form stems in large part from the centralization of management.  
Therefore, state corporation law, particularly Delaware, tends to be strongly 
 
255. See Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, supra note 251, at 112–13.  
256. Christine Hurt, The Hostile Poison Pill, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137, 145 (2016) (citing 
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1373 (Del. 1995) (pointing out directors’ inherent 
conflict of interests in contests of corporate control)); see also eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. 
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (noting the factors that may cloud human judgment in the 
context of a bid).   
257. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991). 
258. Pinto, supra note 16, at 259. 
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committed to management’s control over the “business and affairs”259 of a 
corporation.   
In order to balance the power of managers in the context of a hostile 
takeover and elsewhere, corporation law responds both substantively, e.g., by 
imposing fiduciary duties on managers,260 and procedurally, e.g., by giving 
shareholders rights to file suit to vindicate their own and the corporation’s 
rights.261  These doctrines and mechanisms exist to police management and to 
prevent directors and officers from, for example, repelling fair but unsolicited 
takeover offers thereby entrenching and enriching themselves at shareholders’ 
expense.  The balance between corporate management and shareholders is a 
subject of extensive scholarship and debate,262 but it is well established that the 
ability and appetite of state corporation law to police management has 
decreased over the years.263  Doctrines such as the business judgement rule, 
statutory innovations such as director exculpation laws, and procedural hurdles 
to shareholder litigation have eroded shareholder power to address 
management’s flaws.264  What may be left for shareholders is the market for 
corporate control, although its strength is unclear.265   
C. Board Powers and Traditional Takeover Defenses  
Delaware courts have maintained that although the board has power over 
the corporation, at its core, “the board’s power to act derives from its 
fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which 
 
259. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001). 
260. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 
698, 702 (1982) (describing fiduciary duty as an alternative to direct monitoring). 
261. Amy Deen Westbrook, Does Banking Law Have Something to Teach Corporations Law 
About Directors’ Duties?, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 397, 402 (2016). 
262. Alan R. Palmiter, Corporate Governance as Moral Psychology, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1119, 1119 (2017) (arguing that corporate governance is best seen as a subset of moral psychology).  
See generally, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 261 (arguing that the weakening of director fiduciary duties 
has been unfortunate for corporate governance). 
263. State courts are consistently deferential to managers, notably through the elaboration of the 
business judgment rule, arguing that robust judicial involvement in business might chill risk-taking, 
and thereby stifle the entrepreneurial spirit. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 
693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) aff’d 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (declining to impose liability on a corporate 
director). 
264. See Amy Deen Westbrook, Double Trouble: Collateral Shareholder Litigation Following 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigations, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1229–32 (2012) (detailing 
hurdles to shareholder suits to enforce director fiduciary duties).   
265. See, e.g., Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture 
in High-Tech Firms, FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (exploring ways in which the “market 
for corporate control” does not in fact protect shareholders).  
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includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived, irrespective of its 
source.”266  The board’s actions in the face of a takeover bid must reflect its 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders. 
If the board determines that it has reasonable grounds to believe a takeover 
effort poses a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness, then the board may 
itself, without shareholder action, employ devices to defend the corporation.267  
Some of the most common of these devices are classified board structures, share 
repurchases, lockups, supermajority requirements, and shareholder rights plans 
(so-called poison pills).   
A corporation with a classified or staggered board268 elects only a subset of 
its board of directors at each annual meeting, typically only a third of its 
directors in any year.  As a result, it takes even a majority shareholder at least 
two cycles to establish control of the board, a time frame that is usually longer 
than a company cares to wait to accomplish an acquisition or change of 
control.269   
A board may also choose to have the corporation repurchase some of its 
own shares to repel a hostile offer.  The repurchase will presumably raise the 
share price, and reduce the amount of cash held by the company, both of which 
may make the corporation a less attractive target.  In some cases, the board may 
repurchase shares selectively in order to disadvantage a particular, acquisitive 
shareholder.270   
 
266. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). 
267. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554–57 (Del. 1964).  
268. Provisions imposing a classified board structure may be found in the bylaws of 
corporations, and so therefore they may be removable by shareholder vote, though if the provisions are 
included in the articles of incorporation board approval may also be needed. 
269. Empirical evidence suggests that classified boards are effective in reducing the likelihood 
of takeovers. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered 
Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 887 (2002) (finding classified boards to 
be successful: between 1996 and 2000, not a single hostile bid won a ballot box victory against an 
effective staggered board).  
270. For example, in 2015, over-the-counter healthcare products and infant formula maker 
Perrigo Company Plc announced a $2 billion share repurchase plan as part of its defense against an 
offer from the global healthcare company Mylan N.V. Press Release, Perrigo, Perrigo Taking Actions 
to Deliver Shareholder Value Far Superior to Mylan Offer (Oct. 22, 2015), 
http://perrigo.investorroom.com/2015-10-22-Perrigo-Taking-Actions-To-Deliver-Shareholder-Value-
Far-Superior-To-Mylan-Offer [https://perma.cc/NGZ3-RVH2].  Perrigo’s defense was ultimately 
successful, although it weakened the company substantially. Robert Cyran, Hostile Takeover Battle 
Can Weaken a Company’s Defenses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/14/business/dealbook/hostile-takeover-battle-can-weaken-a-
companys-defenses.html [https://perma.cc/WZB9-FM8R].  Perrigo shareholders also later sued the 
company over alleged misleading statements made during the takeover attempt. Michael Greene, 
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Another technique that target corporations deploy to repel hostile acquirers 
is the lockup, through which the corporation encumbers some asset or assets 
that make it attractive.  Boards may also impose supermajority voting 
requirements for charter amendments, bylaws, amendments, or mergers, 
although courts tend to be cautious of such requirements.271   
In addition, a corporation may adopt a shareholder rights plan,272 known as 
a poison pill.  Although shareholder rights plans vary, they typically provide 
additional “rights” to shareholders which become valuable when a triggering 
event, such as someone acquiring 20% of the corporation’s shares, takes place.  
If triggered, the rights plan then enables the existing shareholders, but not the 
shareholder who or which triggered the plan, to purchase additional shares at a 
steep discount.  The result is dilution of the triggering shareholder’s interest.  In 
practice, shareholder rights plans are seldom actually triggered,273 and they 
function more as a deterrent to would-be acquirers.  They arguably provide the 
board with the leverage to extract a higher price from the potential acquirer, and 
can be redeemed or reset as negotiations require.  Shareholder rights plans, 
although permitted, have been criticized for providing excessive protection to 
incumbent management.274   
D. Judicial Review of Antitakeover Defenses 
Although antitakeover defenses are generally permissible, they may also be 
abused.  Corporation law therefore has worked to provide limits and a standard 
of review for their use.  In doing so, courts have balanced traditional (if 
increasing) deference to the board as the body controlling the business and 
affairs of corporations, with the need to provide shareholders with a remedy 
when the board’s actions prevent the operation of Manne’s market for corporate 
control.  Board entrenchment is often equated with bad governance, and 
 
Investor Sues Perrigo Over Disclosures in Mylan Hostile Bid, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2016), 
https://www.bna.com/investor-sues-perrigo-n57982072957/ [https://perma.cc/PE4U-NH72]. 
271. See Frechter v. Zier, No. 12038-VCG, 2017 WL 345142, at *3 (Del. Ch. Jan. 24, 2017) 
(invalidating bylaw language that required supermajority stockholder approval for the removal of 
directors and noting that the measure was intended as a takeover defense and unrelated to any board 
classification). 
272. E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN., tit. 8, § 157 (2001) (Rights and Options Respecting Stock).  
273. But see Versata Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 586 (Del. 2010). 
274. John S. Strong & John R. Meyer, An Analysis of Shareholder Rights Plans, 11 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 73, 73 (1990) (“[o]pponents argue that poison pills are designed to 
entrench existing board and management control and to prevent any takeover that does not have the 
support of the board of directors.”). 
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considered detrimental to shareholders and the markets.275  In the context of 
takeovers, this struggle for balance is often played out in judicial review of 
board decisions to deploy various antitakeover measures.   
A merger, acquisition, or takeover involves managers’ power to maintain 
the status quo (including their continued employment), conversely denying the 
shareholders a profitable opportunity.  The transactions have generally been 
understood to raise potential conflicts of interest, implicating the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty.276  As a matter of contemporary legal history, the erosion of 
shareholders’ power to constrain management, or even to assert their interests, 
has been less pronounced when the managers’ misbehavior implicates their 
duty of loyalty.  Nevertheless, the emergence of a bidder, even a hostile 
“raider,” does not directly benefit incumbent directors.  Nor, as discussed 
below, does the adoption of defensive measures necessarily constitute self-
dealing.  Courts therefore have not adopted the intrinsic fairness standard of 
review used when a director has a clear conflict of interest and the duty of 
loyalty is implicated.277   
Instead, courts have developed a specific jurisprudence to assess board 
actions in the takeover context.  “When a board addresses a pending takeover 
bid it has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders.”278  Courts may be more cautious of board 
decisions in the takeover context than in the context of other decisions because 
they have the potential to deny shareholders the opportunity to vote on sale of 
the company at the premium being offered.  Courts have long recognized “the 
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, 
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders.”279   
Thus, state courts typically deny board decisions in the takeover context the 
near-automatic deference of the business judgment rule, though courts also 
spare them the more thorough intrinsic fairness examination.  Board decisions, 
 
275. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance?, 22 REV. FIN. 
STUD. 783, 784–85 (2004) (introducing the entrenchment index or “E-Index”).  But see K.J. Martijn 
Cremers et al., Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 
727 (2016) (arguing that limiting some shareholder rights may increase firm value).  
276. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (explaining that the 
risk of the board acting in its own interests necessitates judicial examination before the board can claim 
the protections of the business judgment rule). 
277. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 769, 795–96 (2006) (noting that if the intrinsic fairness test were used, then takeover 
defenses would seldom be approved). 
278. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
279. Id. 
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including those related to the adoption of antitakeover devices, are subject 
instead to an “intermediate” level of scrutiny,280 “an enhanced duty which calls 
for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business 
judgment rule may be conferred.”281  Courts review the measures implemented 
by the board to make sure the board is operating in the long-term interests of 
the shareholders and not just protecting its members and the executive officers.  
“A reasonable use of a defensive tactic will encourage the original bidder to 
increase its premium or invite higher bidders; an unreasonable use will thwart 
all bidders and entrench management.”282   
A key articulation of the standard of review for defensive measures was the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum 
Corp.283  In the Unocal decision, the court considered the effort of Mesa 
Petroleum Corp. (Mesa), led by T. Boone Pickens, to take over Union Oil 
Company of California (Unocal).284  The Mesa offer featured a two-tiered 
pricing mechanism: Mesa offered a $54/share cash tender at the “front-end” to 
obtain ownership of 51% of Unocal at a premium, and then a securities 
exchange offer, later found to be worth considerably less, to the slower-to-
tender, remaining shareholders.285  The Unocal board, with the advice of Peter 
Sachs of Goldman Sachs & Co. decided that the Mesa offer was inadequate and 
coercive.286  In response, the board came up with a $72/share repurchase offer 
that excluded Mesa.287  Mesa challenged Unocal’s defensive self-tender tactic 
as a breach of the board’s fiduciary duties.288   
In upholding Unocal’s selective self-tender tactic, the Delaware Supreme 
Court created the “Unocal test” with which to analyze defensive board tactics.  
The test, which was refined later that year in Moran v. Household International 
Inc.,289 creates a two-pronged review for a corporation’s antitakeover tactics.  
First, did the board have reasonable grounds to believe a threat to the 
corporation existed?290  Second, were the defensive measures taken reasonable 
 
280. Bainbridge, supra note 277, at 796 (also calling the level of review an “enhanced business 
judgment” standard). 
281. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. 
282. Hurt, supra note 256, at 146. 
283. 493 A.2d at 946. 
284. Id. at 949. 
285. Id. at 949–50. 
286. Id. at 950. 
287. Id. at 951. 
288. Id. 
289. 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985).  
290. Id. 
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in relation to the perceived threat?291  As later cases have noted, the Unocal test 
is intended to detect “self-interest and pretext”292 when directors make clearly 
self-interested decisions in a takeover context.  Using the test, the Unocal court 
found that the Mesa offer was coercive due to the two-tiered structure and 
inadequate in terms of amount, and that the board’s adoption of its poison pill 
(the self-tender) was reasonable because of Pickens’ reputation and the two-
tiered structure.293   
But, the Unocal court stressed, the question of whether a given defensive 
measure is permissible in a particular case requires balanced judgement.  
Permissible antitakeover mechanisms are supposed to “forestall tender offers, 
but they may not preclude them.”294  As the court explained, “[a] corporation 
does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any 
Draconian means available.”295  Antitakeover devices cannot be used as an 
indefinite mechanism for the board to avoid challenges to its control.  Directors 
may not act “solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in 
office.”296  The board cannot “just say no” to corporate takeovers.297   
Thus courts, even in Delaware, may reject the use of takeover devices.  As 
the court observed that same year in Revlon, Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings Inc.,298 directors do not have unlimited power to defend the 
corporation against threats to their policies.  If at some point the corporation is 
for sale (perhaps because the corporation seeks to sell itself to another, more 
palatable acquirer), then the board’s obligation changes to allowing market 
forces to operate freely to bring the target’s shareholders the best price available 
for their shares.299  As the Delaware Chancery Court pointed out in 2010 in 
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v Newmark: “[l]ike any strong medicine . . . a 
[poison] pill can be misused.”300    
 
291. Id. 
292. Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242, 258–59 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
293. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959. 
294. Hurt, supra note 256, at 150. 
295. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
296. Id. (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964)). 
297. See Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder 
Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 315 (2001) (reviewing courts’ 
willingness to allow boards to adopt preclusive measures). 
298. 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986) (rejecting the Revlon board’s excessive resistance to Pantry 
Pride’s hostile tender offer). 
299. Id. at 184. 
300. 16 A.3d 1, 29–30 (Del. Ch. 2010) (assessing the shareholders rights plan and staggered 
board adopted by two shareholder directors of Craigslist to disenfranchise the third shareholder, eBay). 
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Despite the complex legal judgements, however, courts are generally not 
anxious to invalidate boards’ antitakeover measures.  If the board can 
demonstrate that its measures or tactics “are reasonable and proportionate, and 
designed to protect [its] long-term corporate strategy,”301 a challenge to the 
board actions will likely fail.302  Nevertheless, although there has been an 
overall decrease in M&A litigation in the last few years, 85% of public 
company mergers were the subject of lawsuits in either state or federal court in 
2017.303  Courts actively review board actions in the context of both friendly 
and unsolicited acquisitions.  This review, or even the discipline produced by 
the possibility of such review, however, is unavailable in takeovers which may 
be referred to CFIUS.   
VII. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSION 
A. CFIUS, Uncertainty, and Risk 
Corporation law has decades of decisions dedicated to assessment of 
boards’ use of defensive measures.  Market participants, therefore, have some 
sense of what a hostile takeover is likely to require, and consequently, a basis 
for negotiation.  CFIUS review, in contrast, offers boards a defensive device, a 
weapon in the battle for corporate control, that is outside of that jurisprudence 
when the acquisition is in sensitive sectors and has foreign connections.  Before 
a court can assess the board’s behavior, and consider the opportunity offered to 
the target company shareholders, CFIUS review can result in the immediate and 
total prohibition of the proposed transaction.  The effect of that weapon is 
magnified by the booming M&A market and, especially post-FIRRMA, 
CFIUS’s own expansive understandings of what constitute U.S. businesses and 
its authority over foreign investors.   
 
301. Hurt, supra note 256, at 141. 
302. In fact, several relatively recent decisions have seemed to expand the devices that the courts 
will accept using the Unocal test.  In its 2010 decision in Versata Enterprises v. Selectica, Inc., the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld a poison pill with a very low trigger (4.99%) adopted by Selectica, 
Inc., to protect its ability to carry its net operating losses forward. 5 A.3d 586, 599–607 (Del. 2010).  
The plan, which featured a very low (4.99%) ownership threshold, was triggered when Selectica’s rival 
and its parent company acquired 6.7% of Selectica’s common stock.  In its 2011 decision in Air 
Products and Chemicals Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a board’s use of the 
threat of a poison pill to hold off an open tender offer for twelve months. 16 A.3d 48, 48–49 (Del. Ch. 
2011).   
303. Lauren C. Bellerjeau et al., 8 Key M&A Trends in 2018, MORRISON FOERSTER (Jan. 31, 
2018), https://www.mofo.com/resources/publications/180131-8-key-ma-trends-in-2018.html 
[https://perma.cc/EK4Y-5MRJ] (noting that this was down from 2013, when 96% of mergers triggered 
litigation). 
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For example, the “U.S. business” at issue may be a U.S. branch or 
subsidiary of a non-U.S. target of an acquisition (e.g., Aixtron).  A “foreign 
person” may be incorporated in the United States, but have foreign shareholders 
or management connections that can exercise control over it (e.g., Ralls).  
Alternatively, the “foreign person” seeking to acquire the U.S. business may be 
a company incorporated in a tax haven jurisdiction but based in the U.S. and 
owned and controlled by U.S. persons (e.g., Broadcom).  Particularly if the non-
U.S. interests are from non-NATO countries such as China, this broad 
understanding and willingness to look upstream impacts a potentially large 
number of transactions.304   
In addition, because CFIUS’s understanding of national security, especially 
post-FIRRMA, encompasses critical infrastructure, critical technology and 
access to sensitive information on U.S. persons,305 the number of transactions 
that may be understood to implicate national security and are therefore subject 
to CFIUS review is very large.  According to a Deloitte report at the end of 
2017, acquiring technology assets was the number one strategic driver of M&A 
deals306 and there was “no sign of cross-sector convergence abating amid 
increasingly innovative investment strategies.”307  As KPMG explained in its 
2018 M&A Predictor report, “[a]mong financial services firms, consumer, 
industrial, healthcare, automotive companies—you name it, including 
agriculture—the race is on for transformational technology and game-changing 
digital capabilities.”308  KPMG noted that industrial businesses have been 
purchasing technology companies and, in the reverse direction, technology 
sector companies have been seeking consumer-oriented acquisitions.309  
Technology is everywhere, hence the 27 industries in the Pilot Program Annex.  
Therefore, a great number of acquisitions will implicate national security.  And 
if Chinese or other non-NATO country investors are the acquirer, or somewhere 
upstream in the acquirer, or perhaps even likely to benefit from the acquisition 
 
304. M&A Guide to CFIUS: Deciding Whether to Submit Voluntarily to CFIUS Review, supra 
note 193. 
305. Id. (noting that such access was rumored to have been the reason for Ant Financial’s failure 
to receive CFIUS clearance for its acquisition of MoneyGram). 
306. The State of the Deal: M&A Trends 2018, supra note 241, at 7; Naso, supra note 2. 
307. M&A Predictor 2018 Annual Report, KPMG (May 2018), 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/05/m-and-a-predictor-2018-annual-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQC4-6UMP]; The State of the Deal: M&A Trends 2018, supra note 241, 
at 12 (highlighting industry convergence). 
308. M&A Predictor 2018 Annual Report, supra note 307.  
309. Id.  
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to the detriment of U.S. national security, CFIUS review is potentially available 
to an unwilling target’s board.   
The prospect of CFIUS review has created uncertainty, and various efforts 
to structure and price transactions involving foreign parties and sensitive 
industries in ways that accommodate the increased regulatory risk.310  Foreign 
investors are disadvantaged because they face risks and delays, and increased 
public scrutiny, that domestic investors do not.311  Some practitioners even cite 
a CFIUS “discount” in certain transactions.312  Although FIRRMA provides for 
increased CFIUS staffing and funding,313 uncertainty and delays are still 
expected to increase because FIRRMA triggers more notifications.314  Thus, the 
expansion of CFIUS review, at a minimum, has made the corporate governance 
benefits of the market for corporate control more expensive.  The deployment 
of CFIUS review at the discretion of the target board, moreover, can wipe out 
shareholders’ rights to consider an unsolicited offer or vote for insurgent 
directors sponsored by certain would-be acquirers.   
B. CFIUS and the Federalization of Corporation Law 
The expansion of CFIUS review into the realm of takeover defenses and 
corporate governance may also be seen as yet another instance of the creeping 
federalization of corporation law.315  Most countries have national company 
law, but the United States has traditionally left the creation and regulation of 
 
310. See Comey & O’Bryan, supra note 201; Emmerich & Panovka, supra note 200 (explaining 
the rise of “reverse break fees” and insurance coverage for “CFIUS-related non-consummation risk”).   
311. Comey & O’Bryan, supra note 201. 
312. After Broadcom/Qualcomm: Where Does Cross-Border M&A Go Now?, 22 M&A LAW., 
Apr. 2018, at 2 (quoting Robert Townsend, Co-Chair of Morrison & Foerster’s national security and 
global risk & crisis management practices) (identifying a “discount” placed on bids coming from 
foreign buyers because of the uncertainty of CFIUS review).   
313. John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-
232, §§ 1717, 1723, 132 Stat. 1636, 2192, 2204 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 4565(k)(4), 
4565(p) (2018)). 
314. David McLaughlin & Erik Wasson, Congress Toughens Foreign Deal Reviews with China 
in Crosshairs, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2018, 1:38 PM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-01/congress-toughens-foreign-deal-reviews-
with-china-in-crosshairs [https://perma.cc/VUF3-XAWS].  
315. In fact, the plaintiffs in the shareholder suit against Qualcomm described the Qualcomm 
board’s successful resort to CFIUS thus: “In complete disregard of the U.S. federal-state structure, the 
incumbent Board seeks a federal takeover of Delaware corporation law to ensure their continuation in 
office.” Complaint at ¶ 6, Evans v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 2018-0164, 2018 WL 1224253 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
8, 2018). 
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business forms to the laws of the individual states.316  The lack of an articulated, 
national approach to how companies should act may at some point does more 
harm than good, especially in the antitakeover context when states may have an 
incentive to avoid antitakeover restrictions.317   
Of course, this idea of state corporation law may be a thing of the past.  
Although a variety of approaches to corporation law in an atmosphere of legal 
experimentation has undeniable appeal, the preeminence of Delaware law may 
have ended that vision of corporation law federalism already.  And Delaware 
and other state courts have arguably been increasingly (and possibly 
excessively) deferential to board actions.  In addition, with regard to the 
construction of a national company law, the federal government’s willingness 
to intervene in Qualcomm’s corporate formalities and its analysis of 
Broadcom’s business strategies may seem relatively insignificant in 
comparison with the intercession of federal securities laws318 such as the Dodd-
Frank Act319 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.320  And some of CFIUS’s actions 
displace a sibling agency’s (the SEC’s) actions under federal securities laws 
governing proxy fights, not state action.   
In light of the potential breadth of CFIUS review, however, CFIUS may 
offer an opportunity for a national approach to the role of the corporation in 
national security and by extension, the overall economy.321  Are there some 
deals that we, as a nation, think should or should not happen?  What reasons are 
acceptable for that kind of decision?  This type of normativity is not a feature 
of contemporary state corporation, or even federal securities, laws.  But the 
expansion of CFIUS review and its deployment by the Qualcomm board to 
 
316. Pinto, supra note 16, at 262 (noting that the federal government could have provided 
corporation law to publicly traded companies but has traditionally opted to allow the states to develop 
that law). 
317. David. J. Marchitelli, Construction and Application of State Antitakeover Statutes, 37 
A.L.R. 6th 1, 1 (2008) (surveying a variety of state statutes). 
318. Federal securities laws, which deal primarily with disclosure by publicly traded companies, 
and state corporate laws, which more directly address their corporate governance, overlap. Pinto, supra 
note 16, at 264.  The overlap, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.   
319. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 
Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
320. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
sections 15, 18, and 28 of the U.S. Code).  
321. “Some policymakers also argue that the CFIUS review process should have a more robust 
economic component, possibly even to the extent of an industrial policy-type approach that uses the 
CFIUS national security process to promote certain industrial sectors in the economy.” JAMES K. 
JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 1 (2018). 
 
WESTBROOK, MULR VOL. 102, NO. 3 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/22/2019  9:21 AM 
698 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [102:643 
prevent a takeover brings the issue back for consideration in the United States.  
Other countries have these kinds of policies.322  Should we?   
C. CFIUS, Shareholders, and Society  
Post-FIRRMA, CFIUS’s importance continues to expand.  CFIUS now acts 
near the heart of corporation law, in particular with respect to corporate 
governance in the context of hostile takeovers (rescheduling shareholder 
meetings, for example).  CFIUS review, however, is different from other 
takeover defenses.  There is no mechanism to determine if a board decision to 
notify an unsolicited foreign bid to the Committee is reasonable and 
proportionate, or whether that notification protects the long-term corporate 
strategy.  Thus, CFIUS review may insulate management decisions from many 
of the procedural or substantive protections that have traditionally maintained 
a balance between management and shareholders, not to mention market 
structure, and so civil society generally.323   
Perhaps the emergence of CFIUS review as a super poison pill is not all that 
significant.  Maybe traditional understandings of the limitations imposed by 
corporation and securities law on management have already failed.  It is less 
and less credible to rely on fiduciary duty or shareholder derivative suits or even 
securities law to protect shareholder interests given the deeply entrenched 
management at our largest firms.  And in a world of vote-less stock324 and the 
concentration of ownership and control of our equity markets,325 a “just say no” 
option for incumbent management confronted with an unwanted acquirer may 
not be that dramatic a development.   
But more than corporation law is at issue here.  Corporations are not merely 
matters of concern to shareholders, boards, and managers who contest 
governance, or even the broader society of stakeholders.  Corporations are 
deeply enmeshed in the economy and society, and therefore the relationship 
between ownership and management has implications that extend beyond 
stakeholders.  In particular, corporate transactions can raise national security 
concerns, which is why the federal government has various mechanisms with 
 
322. In fact, the United Kingdom is considering a new national security and investment regime 
designed to protect strategically important UK businesses from foreign takeovers. See UK Government 
Proposes National Security and Investment Regime, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON LLP 
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://client.clearygottlieb.com/63/891/uploads/2018-08-09-uk-government-
proposes-national-security-and-investment-regime.pdf [https://perma.cc/FHS6-AAFZ].   
323. See Pinto, supra note 16, at 257 (asserting the importance of publicly traded corporations 
in society as the reason for significant issues regarding the focus of corporate governance).  
324. See Westbrook & Westbrook, supra note 265.  
325. See Amy Deen Westbrook & David A. Westbrook, Unicorns, Guardians, and the 
Concentration of the U.S. Equity Markets, 96 NEB. L. REV. 688, 690 (2018).  
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which to regulate commerce in the interest of security, and why CFIUS was 
established in the first place.   
In addressing national security concerns, however, the law also needs to 
take account of other societal concerns, including the traditional “economic” 
concerns for market structure, investors, the discipline of managers, and the 
evolution of business.  In other words, “national security,” especially when 
premised on something as ubiquitous as “technology,” should not be some sort 
of trump card that obviates all other concerns for commercial, and hence social, 
welfare.   
D. Conclusion 
As illustrated by the prohibition of Broadcom’s attempted takeover of 
Qualcomm, CFIUS review is broad and powerful.  The Committee and the 
President are looking at an increasing number of acquisitions involving foreign 
persons, and operating at the heart of corporation law.  At the same time, the 
volume of global mergers, and CFIUS’s jurisdiction, are on the upswing.  The 
result is the potential use of CFIUS review as a powerful defensive tactic by 
target company boards.   
In assessing notices in this context, CFIUS may benefit from the 
jurisprudence developed by state courts in the 1980s takeover boom.  
Corporation law has been working to articulate standards for board defensive 
tactics and shareholders’ rights for over 30 years, and may provide an approach 
for the Committee to use to weigh the actions and motivations of target boards 
that request review.  For example, tools such as the Unocal test may help the 
Committee identify clearly self-interested board notifications in the takeover 
context.  Such an evaluation can be implemented by CFIUS without 
compromising its own or the President’s national security authority, and may 
in fact provide an opportunity for the federal government to articulate norms 
for our largest and most critical corporations.  CFIUS has considerable latitude 
when presented with a party notification of a transaction, and may be in the best 
position to avert board actions that damage shareholders, and the economy in 
general, using a foreign investor or connection as a pretext.   
Given the amount of global capital being deployed across borders, and the 
intensity of global security concerns, foreign investment transactions are likely 
to continue, and to continue to need review, for the foreseeable future.  A 
CFIUS review process with a standard to assess target company board 
motivation and measures, with an experienced perspective on the broader 
effects of blocking or allowing the transaction, will help ensure that CFIUS 
review achieves its national security goals without doing unnecessary societal 
harm.   
